Using an Educational Module and Simulation Learning Experience to Improve Medication Safety by Durham, Barbara Lynn
The University of San Francisco
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Doctor of Nursing Practice (DNP) Projects Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects
Fall 12-12-2014
Using an Educational Module and Simulation
Learning Experience to Improve Medication Safety
Barbara Lynn Durham
University of San Francisco, bldurham85@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.usfca.edu/dnp
Part of the Other Nursing Commons
This Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @
Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctor of Nursing Practice (DNP) Projects by an authorized administrator of
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.
Recommended Citation
Durham, Barbara Lynn, "Using an Educational Module and Simulation Learning Experience to Improve Medication Safety" (2014).
Doctor of Nursing Practice (DNP) Projects. 42.
https://repository.usfca.edu/dnp/42
Running Head: MEDICATION SAFETY 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using an Educational Module and Simulation Learning Experience to Improve Medication 
Safety  
Barbara Durham, MSN, RN, CNE, DNP-c 
School of Nursing and Health Professions 
University of San Francisco 
N789 – DNP Comprehensive Project, N789 
Dr. KT Waxman, DNP, MBA, RN, CNL, CENP 
11/08/2014 
 
 
MEDICATION SAFETY  2 
 
Table of Contents 
SECTION I: TITLE/ABSTRACT................................................................................................4 
SECTION II: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................5 
BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE:  .....................................................................................................5 
 LOCAL PROBLEM:  .....................................................................................................................7 
Table 1: Medication incidence rates........................................................................................7 
PURPOSE OF CHANGE:  ................................................................................................................9 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE:  .....................................................................................................11 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:  ....................................................................................................19 
 
SECTION III: METHODS 
ETHICAL ISSUES:  ......................................................................................................................22 
SETTING:  ...................................................................................................................................24 
Local environment .................................................................................................................24 
Structures, processes, and patterns .......................................................................................25 
Work processes ......................................................................................................................25 
PLANNING THE INTERVENTION:  ...............................................................................................27 
Aim of entity being changed ...................................................................................................32 
Leadership needs ...................................................................................................................33 
Cost/Benefit Analysis .............................................................................................................33 
Responsibility Matrix .............................................................................................................36 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT:  ......................................................................................37 
PLANNING THE STUDY OF THE INTERVENTION:  ......................................................................42 
Assessment plans ....................................................................................................................42 
Gap analysis...........................................................................................................................43 
Gantt chart .............................................................................................................................44 
Nature of initial process change planned ..............................................................................44 
Leading the change ................................................................................................................44 
METHODS OF EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS:  ...........................................................................45 
Instruments used, analytic methods, and software used ........................................................45 
SWOT Analysis ......................................................................................................................46 
Return on Investment  ............................................................................................................46 
Conceptual and operational definitions.................................................................................48 
SECTION IV: RESULTS 
PROGRAM EVALUATION/OUTCOMES:  .....................................................................................48 
Nature of setting and improvement intervention ...................................................................48 
Table 2: Incidence of PCA use ...............................................................................................48 
Evolution of initial improvement plan ...................................................................................50 
Change in care process ..........................................................................................................51 
System/process failures ..........................................................................................................52 
 
MEDICATION SAFETY  3 
SECTION V: DISCUSSION 
SUMMARY:  ................................................................................................................................53 
Key successes and difficulties ................................................................................................53 
Lessons learned ......................................................................................................................55 
New possibilities ....................................................................................................................57 
Implications............................................................................................................................57 
Dissemination plan ................................................................................................................58 
RELATION TO OTHER EVIDENCE:  ............................................................................................58 
Comparison to previous studies .............................................................................................58 
Similarities/differences ..........................................................................................................59 
BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION:  ............................................................................................60 
Bias ........................................................................................................................................60 
Known barriers ......................................................................................................................60 
Locally held assumptions .......................................................................................................61 
INTERPRETATION:  ....................................................................................................................61 
CONCLUSIONS:  ..........................................................................................................................62 
REFERENCES: ............................................................................................................................64 
 
APPENDIXES: 
A: MEDICATION EVENT OPTIONS WITH RELATED DESCRIPTIONS .........................................72 
B: MEDICATION SAFETY MODULE PPT ...................................................................................73 
C: ADDITIONAL SLIDES FROM TRAINING COURSE ..................................................................79 
D: MEDICATION SAFETY SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT WORKSHEETS ......................................82 
E: PROFORMA/OPERATING STATEMENT..................................................................................87 
F: COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS .....................................................................................................88 
G: RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX ....................................................................................................89 
H: MEDICATION SAFETY SURVEY ABOUT PCA USE (NEEDS ASSESSMENT) ..........................90 
I: GAP ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................................94 
J: GANTT CHART .......................................................................................................................95 
K: POST-SIMULATION REFLECTION SURVEY ..........................................................................97 
L: SWOT ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................................99 
M: BUSINESS PLAN PROPOSAL: PRESENTATION OF OPTIONS ...............................................100 
N: RETURN ON INVESTMENT – BREAK EVEN ANALYSIS ........................................................102 
O: RESULTS OF NEEDS ASSESSMENT (MEDICATION SAFETY SURVEY ABOUT PCA USE) .....103 
P: STAFF MEETING PRESENTATION HANDOUT ......................................................................110 
Q: SUMMARY OF ARTICLES ABOUT MEDICATION SAFETY EDUCATION PROGRAMS ...........114 
R: WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE  .....................................................................................127 
 
MEDICATION SAFETY  4 
 
Using an Educational Module and Simulation Learning Experience to Improve Medication 
Safety  
Abstract 
The purpose of this evidence-based change in practice project was to provide nurses with an 
experiential learning opportunity, using simulation, to identify and report near miss events during 
the medication administration process related to patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) usage. 
Despite extensive in-service training on a Medical/Surgical (Med/Surg) floor in an acute care 
hospital, inconsistent, inaccurate and incomplete documentation with use of the new PCA pumps 
continued to be problematic. A conceptual framework of just culture was used with the quality 
improvement method of the Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycle for testing change. Medication 
safety education was a valid andragogical strategy to decrease rates of medication errors and 
improve patient outcomes by identifying complex system issues that interfered with safe 
practices. The education program consisted of a series of self-learning modules, definitions of 
near miss events and medication errors; in addition a simulation learning experience was 
included. A needs assessment was conducted to help determine gaps in practice. Results of the 
survey demonstrated inconsistencies in the current practice of documenting vital signs on 
patients with a PCA in contrast to the existing policy and procedure; these results were shared 
with the staff nurses at a staff meeting and via email. Although no changes in care delivery were 
directly observed, the doctorate of nursing practice (DNP) student was able to reinforce the 
documentation requirements per the hospital’s policy.  
Key words: medication safety, medication errors, near miss events, medication safety 
education, simulation, patient-controlled analgesia, quality improvement 
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Section II: Introduction 
Background knowledge: 
 The setting consists of a small (172-bed) county hospital, which is also a teaching 
hospital. The organization espouses innovation, compassion, and dedication to high quality, 
patient-centered health care according to their mission and vision statements. Improving quality 
outcomes and increasing patient satisfaction are a few of the stated goals on the hospital’s web 
page. However, being a government run organization, the hospital can be described as 
bureaucratic in terms of the organizational structure and complex processes that slows down the 
completion of an otherwise simple task. For example, the activity of signing a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) for a doctoral student to complete an evidence-based change in practice 
project took approximately six months to get the necessary paperwork signed and processed.  
In January 2014, the hospital was selected to become the region’s designated Level II 
trauma center. As a result, the staff nurses received many hours of education related to caring for 
trauma patients as the implementation plan moves forward. Unfortunately, the needed education 
to prepare for the trauma designation proved to be a significant obstacle in the implementation of 
this evidence-based change in practice project. To further complicate any attempts to sustain 
planned change, there has been significant turnover within the administration. For example, over 
the past 18 months, three different Chief Nursing Officers (CNOs) have occupied the position. In 
addition, the current Chief Executive Officer (CEO) unexpectedly resigned in July 2014, 
resulting in an interim appointment to fill the position.   
There has been a long-standing history of resistance to change within the organization. 
The nursing staff does not readily embrace change and are difficult to motivate to take 
responsibility for quality patient care. For example, when the responsibility for obtaining a 
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second set of vital signs on the shift was transferred to the primary nurse, there was resistance 
and objections to the extra duties the nurse was required to complete on their shift. There is a 
perception of a top-down process in which the nurses are being told to how to do their jobs and 
being made to comply. As such, a culture of safety is not consistently demonstrated based on 
anecdotal comments from the nursing staff and their supervisors; for example, the pharmacy 
director removed privileges from several nurses who were not documenting accurately regarding 
the use of patient-controlled analgesic (PCA) pumps instead of trying to determine the root of the 
problem.  
There is one nursing director who oversees the medical/surgical (Med/Surg) unit, 
intensive care unit (ICU), acute rehabilitation unit (ARU), and Dialysis unit. The director’s span 
of control is comprised of approximately 120 full-time equivalent (FTEs) employees and stated 
that it was difficult to find the time to be the role model the Med/Surg unit needed. The nursing 
director also stated experiencing incivility by her coworkers through sabotage, indifference and 
lack of collaboration.  
 The care problem was broad in terms of improving medication safety. After meeting with 
the directors of Education, Pharmacy, and Quality, there were two specific issues identified; the 
first issue was that nurses were not reporting enough near miss events and secondly, there were 
persistent issues with PCA documentation despite extensive education when the new PCA 
pumps were implemented. The hospital uses the standardized definition of a medication error 
according to the National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention 
(NCC MERP, 2014):  
"A medication error is any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate 
medication use or patient harm while the medication is in the control of the health care 
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professional, patient, or consumer. Such events may be related to professional practice, 
health care products, procedures, and systems, including prescribing; order 
communication; product labeling, packaging, and nomenclature; compounding; 
dispensing; distribution; administration; education; monitoring; and use." (About 
medication errors section, para. 1). 
Local Problem: 
The true severity of the problem was difficult to quantify because of frequent changes in 
reporting processes. Traditionally, Quality Review Reports (QRRs) were collected from 
anonymous reporting through a dedicated phone line or the traditional handwritten method using 
established paper forms. From these reports, data were collected and transcribed to an excel 
spreadsheet that summarized the event date and description for tracking and reporting purposes. 
The hospital also used an external vendor (BETA Healthcare Group) to trial a program to 
measure the stability of medication incident rates from January 2010 until June 2012. This 
system reported the number of incidents per adjusted census units and the categories of incidents. 
A new process began in February 2014 that consisted of on-line reporting using the Quality 
Management/Risk Module in Meditech. These new reports were more detailed and provided 
information based on the number of patient days, number of medication incidents per location, 
total number of QRRs (all types), and total number of QRRs specific to medication incidents. 
Furthermore, both near miss occurrences and medication errors were categorized as medication 
events. It is possible that near misses were incorrectly categorized as errors or went completely 
unreported. Please see table one, for an overview of the medication events.  
Old reporting system   6 months  
 2010 2011 2012   
Census (monthly) 318 321 318  
Incidents (average medication incidents per month) 20.5 18.5 47.7  
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New reporting system FY2011 FY2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 
Number of patient days No data No data 39,344 38,822 
Total # QRRs (all types) No data No data 1665 1912 
Average QRR rate per 1000 patient days  
(all types) 
No data No data 42.3 49.25 
Average QRRs/day (all types) No data No data 4.56 5.24 
% of QRRs specifically related to medication 
events 
 
n=210 
 
n=411 
36%  
n=604 
22% 
n=437 
Average medication related QRRs/1000 patient 
days 
No data No data 15.35 11.26 
% of medication QRRs per location: ICU and 
Med/Surg 
No data No data 19% 
n=115 
23.1% 
n=101  
% of medication QRRs per location: Med/Surg 
(only) 
No data No data No data 13.5% 
n=59 
FY=Fiscal year (July-June); QRRs=Quality Review Reports; ICU-Intensive Care Unit; 
Med/Surg=Medical/Surgical Unit 
Table 1: Medication Incident Rates  
A review of the QRRs related to medication events from the 2012-2013 fiscal year 
demonstrated several issues. Examples of systems factors affecting safe medication 
administration in this small acute care hospital include lack of pharmacy driven protocols (i.e. 
Heparin), patient-controlled analgesic pumps that do not have the most frequently used opioid 
analgesics programmed (i.e. Fentanyl), and intravenous (IV) infusion pumps have out dated drug 
libraries programmed with ineffective safety guardrails. With the current IV pumps there is no 
efficient way to program new drugs; updates consist of a very labor-intensive process because of 
a lack of wireless integration.  
From a human perspective, a survey conducted in summer of 2013 by the hospital 
examined staff perceptions of patient safety and error reporting; results indicated 88% of staff 
perceived that patients are provided safe care and 75% of staff perceive error-reporting is non-
punitive. Although staff perceptions are high, room for improvement existed in order to 
determine the extent of awareness of the variety of factors surrounding medication errors. Lastly, 
according to the last Medication Error Reduction Plan (MERP) results, the hospital was found to 
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have deficiencies in reporting near miss events, making the current situation unacceptable. The 
literature describes under reporting near miss events and medication errors as a pervasive issue; 
this hospital is no different with the challenges experienced with medication event reporting. 
In September 2013, the hospital changed the infusion pumps being used for patient-
controlled analgesia delivery to increase patient safety by monitoring end-tidal carbon dioxide 
(ETCO2) concentrations. The pharmacy director reported improper documentation and 
incomplete assessment practices as persistent problems with both the old and new PCA devices. 
There are 400 nurses employed at the hospital with approximately 200 nurses having completed 
an orientation checklist verifying their understanding of the use and management of the new 
PCA pump. Not all nurses were required to complete the training because of service area and 
infrequency in caring for patients with PCAs. Primarily nurses from Med/Surg and Labor and 
Delivery care for the most patients on PCA pumps.  
Electronic health record (EHR) audits revealed inadequate or incomplete documentation 
for vital signs, patient assessment, and amount of drug administered. Specifically, according to 
the pharmacy director, one third of the nursing staff who received the educational in-service 
were not documenting correctly and an absence of a second independent verification had been 
noted. However, further details regarding the scope of the problem was not differentiated per 
nursing unit. In general, these practices posed a huge liability for the hospital by increasing the 
risk for medication errors and impacting patient safety.  
Purpose of Change: 
Over the course of this project, the purpose has evolved as a result of many obstacles. 
Initially, the purpose of the project was medication safety in terms of increasing the nurses’ 
awareness of factors often associated with medication errors. The second focus became evident 
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in response to the question “What is the best method to measure increased awareness of 
medication safety?” when planning the evaluation of the project. The decision at that time was to 
focus on QRRs by educating nurses on how to report near miss events in order to become 
compliant with outside regulatory agencies (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 
State of California Department of Health Care Services, and The Joint Commission (TJC)). 
Lastly, concerns were expressed from the directors of pharmacy, quality management and 
education related to continued issues with the use and management of PCA pumps, including 
non-compliance with the established interdisciplinary policy and procedure and incomplete 
documentation. Both pharmacy and quality management departments were tracking the problems 
and working collaboratively to develop a resolution. In an effort to improve patient safety, new 
PCAs pumps with ETCO2 monitoring were purchased and implemented in September 2013. 
Nurses received a two-hour educational in-service provided by the vendor with an additional 
one-hour hands on opportunity with a “super-user” to review pump programming, the PCA 
policy, and practice documentation in the EHR. Despite this method of education, issues with 
documentation and adherence to the policy persisted.  
According to the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), it is reasonable to 
implement small tests of change to determine how effectively the planned change will lead to the 
desired improvements, which combination of changes will produce sustainable results, and to 
evaluate costs, social impact and side effects from a proposed change (IHI, 2014). Essentially, 
this test of change was measuring the impact of multiple, different educational modalities on 
changing behavior. A traditional PowerPoint (PPT) was converted into a HealthStream© (a 
learning management system) course and used to educate nurses on medication safety concepts 
(developed by a DNP student). A second PPT was used to introduce the new online QRR 
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reporting system (developed by the hospital’s quality department). Several educational 
techniques were used to increase compliance with PCA documentation: just in time training 
while observing nurses when PCAs were in use, face-to-face interviews to gain insight regarding 
current practice and system obstacles, using an online survey to complete a needs assessment, 
and a developing a simulation experience involving PCA care and management.  
Based on the needs of the organization, there were two AIM statements for this project. 
The first AIM statement was, “By September 31, 2014, the nursing staff on the Med/Surg unit 
will increase the number of near miss reports using the new QRR module by 10%”. The second 
AIM statement was, “By September 31, 2014, the nursing staff on the Med/Surg unit will 
achieve greater than 50% compliance with documentation of narcotic volumes and dosages given 
on the PCA Change/Co-signature required screen in the EHR”.  
Review of the Evidence: 
Both CINAHL and Proquest databases were searched using key terms such as factors 
contributing to medication errors, human factors, system factors, human error, medication safety, 
medication education, costs of medication errors, medication error rates, and near miss error 
rates. Articles were reviewed to determine the scope of the problem, educational interventions, 
and costs of medication errors. The Johns Hopkins Nursing Evidence Based Practice (JHNEBP) 
Research Evidence Appraisal tool was used to determine the strength of the evidence, study 
results and conclusions. The majority of the research articles were rated as Level III because 
most were non-experimental studies and the majority of the non-research articles were literature 
reviews (Level 5); the quality ratings for the scientific evidence were rated as predominately 
good quality. See Appendix Q for the complete review of articles about medication safety 
programs, scope of the problem and contributing factors and the cost of medication errors.  
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Administration of medications in a hospital setting is a daily occurrence; every nurse 
administers an average of 10 medication doses for every patient, every day (Aspden, Wolcoctt, 
Bootman & Cronenwett, 2007). The act of giving a medication is not a simple task; in fact the 
process is fraught with complexities. Medication administration errors occur at alarming rates in 
hospitals. The human and financial costs of these errors are astronomical; estimated direct costs 
are approximately $21 billion, indirect costs exceed $75 billion and account for approximately 
7000 lives lost annually (Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Kohn, Corrigan, Donaldson, 
2000; New England Health Institute (NEHI), 2011). There are many factors derived from human 
and system sources, contributing to these startling statistics. 
Exact numbers of medication errors are difficult to obtain because not all medication 
errors are detected and not all detected errors are reported (Dennison, 2007; Hughes & Blegen, 
2008). The committee on Identifying and Preventing Medication Errors reports at least 1.5 
million preventable medication errors and adverse drug events (ADEs) occur each year in the 
United States, excluding errors of omission (Aspden, et al., 2007). It is estimated that on average, 
the hospitalized patient will be exposed to a minimum of one medication error each day they are 
hospitalized (Aspden, et al., 2007) due to the volume of occurrences.  It is estimated that for 
every detected medication error, there are approximately 100 errors that go undetected daily as a 
result of the sheer volume of medications being prescribed, dispensed, and administered in the 
hospital (NEHI, 2011). Wahr et al. (2013) conducted a retrospective cross-sectional study (Level 
3) and found the severity of harm for patients experiencing a medication error is low; greater 
than 90% of all medication errors result is no or low harm, with only 10% contributing to serious 
patient harm. After conducting a non-experimental, retrospective analysis (Level 3) of 
medication errors, Pinella, Murillo, Carrasco, and Humet, (2006), found that 36% of errors 
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resulted in slightly increased monitoring, 31% of errors did not result in patient harm, and 26% 
of the errors did not actually reach the patient. This means that the safety systems that have been 
implemented are moderately working to catch and prevent serious harm or death. 
Unfortunately, nurses are often not aware that a medication error or near miss event has 
occurred (Choo, et al., 2010) or what constitutes a medication error (Dennison, 2007). Without 
clear definitions, the degree of underreported medication errors cannot be fully recognized, thus 
contributing to the inability to change key aspects of the complex medication delivery system 
(Harding & Petrick, 2008). The number of medication administration errors is underestimated 
and generally under-reported by an estimated 90% (McDermott, 2013). In a seminal 
ethnomethodological study, Baker (1997) identified six ways nurses categorize medication 
errors: it is not a medication error if a) it is not my fault; b) everyone knows; c) you can put it 
right; d) a patient has needs that are more urgent than the accurate administration of medication; 
e) it is a clerical error; and f) the irregularity prevents something worse. Baker determined that if 
an error occurred that could not be ascribed to one of these six categories, then it was considered 
a real medication error; at which time, the nurse’s highest priority was to protect the patient. 
These conditions offer a deep insight into why errors are underreported.  
There is an existing culture of fear and blame associated with the stigma and 
ramifications of reporting medication errors; approximately 50% of nurses are reticent about 
reporting medication errors because they fear disciplinary action and often don’t report them 
(Brady, Malone & Fleming, 2009; Dennison, 2007). Additional explanations for under-reporting 
include an unawareness that a medication error has occurred, unfamiliarity with reporting 
processes when a medication error does occur, fear of legal ramifications, and fear of being 
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perceived as incompetent (Brady, Malone & Fleming, 2009; Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 
2010; Dennison, 2007; Harding & Petrick, 2008). 
There is a stigma attributed to making an error, and perceived repercussions if the error is 
negatively reflected in the nurse’s performance evaluation. An AHRQ survey found that 56% of 
nurses thought mistakes are held against them and occurrences were recorded in personnel files 
(AHRQ, 2012). Choo, Hutchinson, and Bucknall (2010) recommend a simplified process for 
reporting medication errors and emphasized the need for developing a culture of safety by not 
punishing those who do report these errors. Brady, Malone, and Fleming (2009) suggest 
developing a clear definition of what a medication error is in order to increase the accuracy of 
reporting. Dennison (2007) recognized that leadership has a crucial role in creating practice 
change using a culture of safety; continuing to blame the individual or expect error-free 
performance is not realistic. A culture of safety will augment the reporting process of medication 
errors and reduce the likelihood that the same type of error will reoccur (Harding & Petrick, 
2008; Wolf, Hicks & Serembus, 2006). Benner et al. (2002) identified a concept known as 
practice responsibility; which refers to individual accountability and experiential learning that is 
shared with others to collectively change practice by creating a safer patient care environment.  
The traditional approach to medication administration includes the five rights as the 
standard and foundation by which nurses are taught; however, these five rights do not reflect the 
fundamental intricacies associated with the process of administering medications in a hospital 
setting (Choo, et al, 2010; Harding & Petrick, 2008). There is a strong consensus that the five 
rights consists of the right patient, drug, dose, route, and time; additional rights have been added 
to include right reason (Benner, et al., 2002; Harding & Petrick), and documentation (Harding & 
Petrick).  
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According to the California Health and Safety Code §1339.63, the legal definition of a 
medication-related error refers to any preventable medication-related event that adversely affects 
a patient in general acute care hospitals, and “that is related to professional practice, or health 
care products, procedures, and systems, including, but not limited to, prescribing, prescription 
order communications, product labeling, packaging and nomenclature, compounding, 
dispensing, distribution, administration, education, monitoring, and use” (2011, para. 5). As 
mentioned previously, the hospital uses the standardized definition of a medication error 
according to the National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention 
(NCC MERP).  
The process of medication delivery includes several components: prescribing, dispensing, 
administration, and evaluation. Nurses are directly and consistently involved in the 
administration phase of medication delivery and thus are well positioned to prevent medication 
errors from reaching the patient (Harding & Petrick, 2008; Kazaoka, Ohtsuka, Ueno, & Mori, 
2007; Page & McKinney, 2007). Despite numerous definitions, a medication error can simply be 
defined as an actual or potential event, which may be preventable, and can lead to patient harm 
(Aspden, Wolcott, Bootman & Cronenwett, 2007; Choo, Hutchinson & Bucknall, 2010; 
Dennison, 2007; Fowler, Sohler, & Zarillo, 2009; Harding & Petrick, 2008; Taneja & 
Wiegmann, 2004; Wolf, Hicks, & Serembus, 2006). Making an error in the preparation of 
medication for a patient, by intercepting or recognizing the error before it reaches the patient is 
an example of a near miss event (Choo, Hutchinson & Bucknall, 2010; ISMP, 2009; Koohestani 
& Baghcheghi, 2009; Reid-Searl, Moxhan, & Happell, 2010). Wolf and Hughes (2008) report 
the magnitude and consequence of under reporting near miss events; near miss events can occur 
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300 times more frequently than adverse events and if reported, provide rich evidence to 
proactively reduce errors. 
During medication administration, human errors can be attributed to the complex, multi-
step system processes that are established in the hospital (Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; 
Clancy, Effken, & Pesut, 2008; Harding & Petrick, 2008). Common human characteristics 
contributing to medication error include: 
1. Problems with communication between health care providers were frequently 
cited as a contributing factor for medication errors (Benner, et al., 2002; Brady, 
Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Hughes, & 
Blegen, 2008; Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 2014; Reid-Searl, Moxham, & 
Happell, 2010; Saintsing, Gibson, & Pennington, 2011).  
2. Problem with doctor’s orders consisted of illegible handwriting, incomplete 
orders, and use of inappropriate or unapproved abbreviations (Benner, et al., 
2002; Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 2014; 
Saintsing, Gibson, & Pennington, 2011). 
3. The experience of the nurse was a factor in avoiding medication errors; lack of 
experience was a likely contributing factor to explain deviations from policies, 
procedures, and protocol that resulted in a medication error (Brady, Malone, & 
Fleming, 2009; Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Hughes & Blegen, 2008; 
Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 2014; Reid-Searl, Moxham, & Happell, 2010; 
Saintsing, Gibson, & Pennington, 2011; Wolf, Hicks, & Serembus, 2006).  
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4. Lack of knowledge related to pharmacology and math calculation skills was 
linked to more medication errors (Brady, Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Hughes, & 
Blegen, 2008; Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 2014; Kiekkas, et al., 2011).  
5. Poor understanding of the equipment, such as IV infusion pumps, added to 
problem of medication errors (Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 2014; Saintsing, 
Gibson, & Pennington, 2011).  
6. Process issues such as distractions, interruptions that affect the provider’s ability 
to focus on the task of administering medications; examples include events on the 
unit, patient needs, or demands from coworkers (Benner, et al., 2002; Brady, 
Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Hughes, & 
Blegen, 2008; Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 2014; Wolf, Hicks, & Serembus, 
2006). 
7. Personal neglect is described as multi-tasking or by preparing medication in 
advance (Brady, Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 
2014). 
8. Multiple demands or stress of the work environment and the complexity of 
patients or physician prescriptions contributed to medication errors (Choo, 
Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Hughes, & Blegen, 2008; Kiekkas, et al., 2011; 
Saintsing, Gibson, & Pennington, 2011). 
Common system characteristics contributing to medication error include: 
1. Environmental factors such as poor lighting, noise levels, and equipment failure 
all contribute the increased incidence of medication errors (Benner, et al., 2002; 
Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010). 
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2. Medication related topics such look alike-sound alike (LASA) medications; 
similar packaging and labels for medications impact the accuracy of medication 
administration  (Brady, Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Benner, et al., 2002; ISMP, 
2007; Karavasiliadou & Athanasakis, 2014). 
3. Inadequate orientation about the policies and procedures for medication 
administration or insufficient training with the medication delivery system or 
barcoding/scanning technology (Benner, et al., 2002; Choo, Hutchinson, & 
Bucknall, 2010). 
4. Nurse staffing, skill mix, shift length, heavy workload, high patient/nurse ratios, 
lack of staff or presence of new staff nurses produces an unsafe environment 
within which the nurse works (Brady, Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Choo, 
Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Hughes & Blegen, 2008; Karavasiliadou & 
Athanasakis, 2014; Kiekkas, et al., 2011; Saintsing, Gibson, & Pennington, 2011). 
5. Technology, lack of clinical decision support features, equipment failures (Brady, 
Malone, & Fleming, 2009; Hughes & Blegen, 2008). 
Opioid errors are one of the top three medication safety issues for 2014 because of 
inadequate assessment and monitoring (Erickson, 2014). Intravenous (IV) meds are more 
dangerous when administering incorrectly because they result in more serious complications 
(Dennison, 2007; Westbrook, Rob, Woods, & Parry, 2011). The probability of at least one error 
was 73%, and when the medication was administered via IV bolus, the chance of error and harm 
were four times more likely (p<0.001) (Westbrook, Rob, Woods, & Parry, 2011). There are 20 
IV drugs that are responsible for 80% of all errors (Dennison, 2007). In a retrospective, cross-
sectional study, opiates, antibacterials and anticoagulants were the top three classes most 
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frequently involved in medication error across the United States and the United Kingdom (Whar, 
et al., 2013).  
Conceptual Framework: 
Healthcare has typically had a punitive approach to errors (Barnsteiner & Disch, 2012; 
Dennison, 2007; Leape, 1994; Marx, 2007; Reason, 2000). To help provide psychological safety 
and reduce the threat of talking about medication errors, a just culture environment is essential. 
Barnsteiner and Disch (2012) describe a just culture as one that is transparent, without fear of 
retribution if a medication error is made and rewards people who report safety-related 
information so that efforts can be directed towards improving and fixing the system.  
According to Berwick and Leape, “if we truly want safer care we will have to design 
safer care systems” (1999, p. 136). Reason (2000) echoes this statement writing, “we cannot 
change the human condition, but we can change the conditions under which humans work” (p. 
769). Emphasis on ‘what’ went wrong, not ‘who’ is at fault is critical (Barnsteiner & Disch, 
2012). The underpinnings of just culture is about creating and supporting a learning culture, one 
that is open and fair, and centered on designing safer systems and managing behavioral choices 
(Marx, 2007). Decades ago, Leape (1994) recognized the paradox that exists in healthcare: the 
standard of practice in medicine and nursing is perfection, however healthcare professionals 
acknowledge that mistakes are inevitable and most want to learn from the mistakes in an 
understanding and supportive environment.  
Marx (2007) describes three behaviors that contribute to error. The first behavior is a 
genuine human error or mistake as a result of an unintentional lapse or slip in judgment. This 
type of error is managed through changes in processes, procedures, or training with the intention 
of consoling or supporting the person who made the mistake. The second behavior is at-risk 
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behavior; this is most frequent and most dangerous behavior! The health care provider makes an 
intentional and conscious choice to engage in the risk behavior because they may believe the risk 
to be justified or may not even recognize the potential for risk. When health care providers 
continually engage in at-risk behavior, they drift from following policies and procedure and best 
practices by developing work-arounds because of time constraints and fluctuating patient needs. 
This behavior is generally managed through removing incentives for at-risk behaviors, creating 
incentive for health behaviors and increasing situational awareness. The last behavior is reckless 
behavior in which there is a conscious disregard of rules/processes or an acceptance of an 
unreasonable amount of risk. This behavior is managed through remedial or punitive action. 
Unless there is a pattern of making medication errors or evidence of reckless behavior, one event 
should not warrant disciplinary action or termination. 
It is unrealistic to expect error-free performance. Reason (2000) describes active failures 
as unsafe acts involving clinicians who are in direct contact with the patient or the system. These 
active failures can be compared to Marx’s description of human error in that they involve lapses, 
mistakes, or unintentional procedural violations. Complex system processes produce latent 
failures (Reason, 2000). These latent conditions are embedded within the organization and 
waiting for the right opportunity (in the presence of an active failure) to present itself. Reason 
(2000) uses a Swiss cheese model to demonstrate how an error can occur despite having system 
defenses and safeguards in place to prevent them. Each slice of Swiss cheese represents a level 
of protection; however gaps still exist, and when these gaps line up, an error can occur. Benner et 
al. (2002) identified a concept known as practice responsibility, which refers to individual 
accountability and experiential learning that is shared with others to collectively change practice 
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by creating a safer patient care environment. It is important for nurses to learn from not only 
their own mistakes, but also from the mistakes of others.  
For an evidence-based change in practice project, the Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycle 
is an appropriate quality improvement method for testing a change. The idea of implementing 
small tests of change to see what “sticks” is used for action-oriented learning (IHI, 2014). The 
first step of the cycle is planning the test of change (in this case, education) and determining the 
methods for collecting data. The second step involves trying out the test on a small scale; for this 
project, the Med/Surg unit was selected, rather than implementing the project throughout the 
entire hospital. Step three involves studying the data and analyzing the results of the education 
module. The final step is the refine the change, based on the previous results, in order to plan the 
next test of change. 
Errors, near misses and adverse drug events (ADEs) must all be reported voluntarily and 
anonymously. Hospital administration will need to adopt a culture of safety to improve the 
reporting of actual and near miss events (Dennison, 2007). A top down approach is preferred 
because higher quality nursing practices are associated with practice environments are supported 
by administration (Flynn, Liang, Dickson, Xie, & Suh, 2012). Hospitals should be preoccupied 
with failure and build defenses to avert errors (Choo, Hutchinson, & Bucknall, 2010; Reason, 
2000). Furthermore, Andel et al., (2012) reported a correlation between how a hospital is 
designed to improve quality of care and patient outcomes. Since errors are comprised of human 
and system factors, hospital administration must also be accountable for faulty systems and 
organizational processes. A just culture environment is also necessary to help provide 
psychological safety and reduce the threat of talking about medication errors. When nurses feel 
safe, they will be more likely to report errors and near miss events. Once systems issues and 
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processes are identified, administration has a responsibility to commit resources and personnel to 
build safer systems in order to improve the quality and safety of patient care. 
Furthermore, education on quality and safety in nursing, the quality improvement 
process, definitions of a near miss event and medication error and how to report them is needed. 
Nurses should know how to perform a root cause analysis. Basic investigation skills include 
asking a series of questions: 1) what happened; 2) what normally happens; 3) what does the 
procedure require; 4) how did it happen; and 5) how are we managing it (Marx, 2007). Nurses 
should be accountable and responsible (to themselves, patients, and the profession) to determine 
why the mistake occurred instead of relying solely on the organization’s quality improvement 
process.  
Section III: Methods 
Ethical Issues:  
 Health care providers are trained to deliver error-free care. No one sets out intending to 
deliberately commit a medication error; however, despite education and experience, nurses still 
make errors. Current estimates suggest that hospitalized patients are subjected to at least one 
medication error per day (Aspen, et al., 2007). When mistakes happen, health care providers 
experience a complex emotional response that includes devastation, embarrassment, desire to 
conceal the mistakes, shifting blame, and resistance to implicate other providers (Wolf & 
Hughes, 2008). Providers have an ethical obligation to tell the truth (veracity) to maintain the 
trust (fidelity) between patient and provider. Unfortunately, medication errors are under reported, 
unrecorded, and under-researched. Further explanations for under-reporting include not being 
aware that a medication error has occurred, not being familiar with how to report the error, and 
fear of legal ramifications or being perceived as incompetent (Brady, Malone & Fleming, 2009; 
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Choo, Hutchinson & Bucknall, 2010; Dennison, 2007; Harding & Petrick, 2008; Wolf & 
Serembus, 2004). Nevertheless, nurses have a moral, legal, and ethical obligation to report 
mistakes. 
Beneficence is an ethical principle that generally defines nurses. The ethics of caring is a 
contractual model in which there is an agreement between nurse and patient; “there is an 
acknowledgement by the patient that the professional practitioner has the requisite skill to make 
the technical decisions” (Carper, 1979, p.17). In addition, the ethical principle of nonmaleficence 
(do no harm) must be considered. Harm is defined as any “avoidable distress caused to the 
patient in the course of providing care” (Grace, 2014, p.27). Harm is usually unintentional, but is 
often avoidable. A nurse must have adequate skills and competence to safely administer 
medications to a patient, however, errors can and do occur. These ethical principles of doing 
good and preventing harm are violated when errors are not reported. 
Medication errors are devastating to everyone; therefore there are many stakeholders for 
this project. Consumers are the primary stakeholders as they are directly impacted by medication 
errors; patients have the right to receive quality care that is free from errors. The second most 
important stakeholders are the healthcare professionals. When nurses commit medication errors, 
they become a second victim because they are traumatized and struggle with the anguish, quilt, 
and loss of self-confidence as they deal with the aftermath of the error. In terms of medication 
safety, nurse autonomy is equally as important as patient autonomy. Ensuring the anonymity of 
the nurses participating in this change in practice project was paramount. In terms of increasing 
near miss reporting, anonymity was maintained. Lastly, the Institutional Review Board for the 
Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at the University of San Francisco granted exemption 
status since this project was deemed a quality improvement project. 
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Setting: 
  Local environment. With respect to the local care environment, the common element or 
shared purpose, which would have the most likely influence of change, is that of patient safety. 
Knowing that nurses are busy, the education module was administered through the hospital’s 
learning management system, Healthstream©, in order to be more convenient for the nurse. 
Instead of coming to work on a day off, the nurse was able to complete the module during 
working hours.  This however, was not without sacrifices. For instance, the nurse would 
experience competing priorities with patient care needs during the shift and may not be fully 
invested in learning. In order to complete the module, the nurse may choose to go through the 
module very quickly, just to get it finished.  
 The hospital is located in a large county along the central coast of California. According 
to the hospital website, the organization is designated as a Safety Net Hospital; this type of 
hospital provides 50% of hospital care for the states 6.6 million uninsured and trains nearly half 
of all new doctors in the state. The county owns the hospital; as such it is a government-run 
organization. This is relevant since most government processes are time consuming, 
cumbersome and convoluted. Planning the implementation of this evidence-based change in 
practice project was no different.  
 Structure, processes, and patterns. The structure of the unit consists of one nursing 
director (who also oversees three other nursing units), one supervising nurse who has assistant 
director types of responsibilities, and two staff nurse III’s who are frequently in the role of 
charge nurse on the day shift. Since both the staff nurse III’s work on the day shift, this results in 
inconsistent oversight and follow up on the evening and night shifts. There are additional nurses 
who assume the role of charge nurse on these off shifts. The Med/Surg unit admits a variety of 
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different patient conditions and has a large number of indigent or uninsured patients. Workflow 
consists of both eight and twelve hour shifts with a majority of full time nurses and few part-time 
or per diem staff. The use of travelling nurses is low; however, the turnover rate has increased 
over the past few months. Staff meetings are held every other month to keep the nursing staff 
updated on how they are accomplishing specific quality metrics for core measures and a new 
discharge process recently implemented.  
One specific pattern of the setting was identified, both from personal experiences and 
anecdotal accounts is a general resistance to change. The staff nurses are very hard workers, 
however, they rarely want to participate in anything “extra”. There is a comfortable habit of 
dysfunction within the unit, which was stated by several staff nurses. An overall consensus was 
people knew what needed to be improved, but they were lacking direct support (i.e. increased 
staffing to make it happen). There is a sense of defeat on the unit because despite identifying 
issues, the administration “doesn’t listen, or do anything about it” and “nursing is the first place 
they cut when times are tough”. As a result, nurses are not fully invested in developing their own 
professional practice in order to improve patient outcomes. Communication within the 
organization goes in both directions, however, there is a distinct perception that administration is 
frequently “telling them what to do”. 
Work processes. As a loosely coupled system, the Med/Surg unit lacks the characteristic 
mutually understood rules that are consistently enforced trait of a tightly coupled organization 
(Thompson, 2014). The nurses follow rules when the director is consistently on the unit; 
however, policies are easily broken when the nursing director is not directly supervising the staff. 
A simple, but specific, example of this is the policy of not having beverages on the workstation 
on wheels (WOWs) while on the unit. When the director was off duty, due to a medical leave, 
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the nurses would keep their beverages with then on the WOWs representing a direct violation of 
the well-known and established policy.  
Nurses on the unit were included in this evidence-based change in practice project. 
Several nurses offered positive comments regarding the medication safety course that was 
presented via Healthstream©. One on one interviews with nurses during working hours were 
conducted to determine current practice with PCA use and augmented an online survey to 
determine current knowledge and familiarity with the PCA policy as well as comfort levels 
working with the devices.   
Nurses in this setting were not proactive to changing their work processes and the status 
quo is widely accepted. An example of the reaction to a change in the work process on the unit is 
presented here. Certified nursing assistants (CNAs) are responsible for obtaining the vital signs 
and documenting the results in the EHR. It is the responsibility of the nurse to review the vital 
signs and act on abnormal findings. The supervising nurse noticed a pattern that abnormal vital 
signs were being missed. Beginning in April 2014, the decision was made to have the CNAs 
obtain the first set of vital signs (at 08:00am for example), and the primary nurse was to obtain 
the second set of vital signs (at 12:00pm for example). One reason is so the nurse can be aware 
first hand of any abnormal vital signs or significant changes from the patient’s baseline. Another 
reason this change was implemented was an attempt to improve patient satisfaction scores 
because the nurse would be spending more time with the patient and giving the patient more 
direct attention. This recommendation was widely protested with the objection of having “extra 
duties” to complete during the shift. The staff nurses were allowed to communicate their 
concerns to the director and supervising nurse. The initial response was to “give it time to work” 
with an explanation of the purpose of the change. Over the next few months, the nurses 
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continued to protest this change, without offering any alternative recommendations to improve 
the process. Effective in September 2014, the workflow returned how it was originally by 
requiring the CNAs to get both sets of vital signs for the shift. This demonstrates that if the staff 
nurses continually resist change, leadership will eventually acquiesce.  
Planning the intervention:  
The medication safety education program consisted of  
1. a series of self-learning modules to identify the importance of having a safe 
environment for medication administration in order to reduce harm as well as 
understanding the human and system factors that impact safe medication 
administration.  
2. examples of near miss events, or actual medication errors to increase awareness 
and completion of risk notifications in order to improve the working conditions by 
identifying system-related medication administration problems.  
3. a simulation experience to highlight safety while caring for a patient with a PCA.   
The DNP student had the primary responsibility for coordinating the three components of 
the education program: conducting a needs assessment, creating the education program (online 
module and simulation exercise), and evaluating the entire process. A work breakdown structure 
was created to assist with the planning (see Appendix R). The first step in implementing the 
educational program was to fully understand the scope of the problem regarding medication 
safety. A comprehensive review of the QRRs from the 2012 – 2013 fiscal year was completed. 
Results confirmed there were breaches in the basic medication administration principles as well 
as significant pharmacy issues. During review of the QRRs, the DNP student made 
recommendations for redefining the medication event categories and subcategories in order to 
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improve medication error reporting. The DNP student worked collaboratively with the quality 
director, information technology (IT), the pharmacy director and the Nursing Informatics 
Clinical Experts (NICE) team to fine-tune the dictionaries in the EHR. Appendix A has the 
revised dictionary that was used in the risk module. To capitalize on the required education for 
the risk module, an introductory medication safety PowerPoint (PPT) was introduced for the 
clinical staff in conjunction with the implementation of the new online risk module.  
To begin planning for the content of the medication safety course, a thorough literature 
review was completed. Medication safety education is commonly recommended as a means to 
improve patient outcomes. Lu, et al., (2013) reported a statistically significant improvement in 
nurses’ knowledge of high-alert medications after a 60-minute PPT presentation was given as the 
educational intervention. Educating nurses about safe administration of medications is 
multifaceted and involves instruction about actions and uses of medications, safe dosage, side 
effects, and nursing implications (Durham & Alden, 2008). In addition, nurses need education 
about 1) the importance of having a safe environment for medication administration by reducing 
distractions, improving lighting and minimizing noise levels (Choo, Hutchinson & Bucknall, 
2010; Wolf, Hicks, & Serembus, 2006); 2) recognizing perceptual factors and the complexities 
inherent in the medication administration process (Page & McKinney, 2007; Saintsing, Gibson, 
& Pennington, 2011; Taneja & Wiegmann, 2004); and 3) integrating pharmacokinetics and 
pharmacodynamics principles into clinical practice (Brady, Malone & Fleming, 2009; Choo, 
Hutchinson & Bucknall, 2010; Durham & Alden, 2008; Sears, Goldworthy, & Goodman, 2010; 
Page & McKinney, 2007). Furthermore, Currie et al., (2009) developed a patient safety 
curriculum that included an overview of patient safety and promotion of mindfulness, hazard and 
near miss reporting, quality improvement methods such as root cause analysis (RCA) or failure 
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mode effects analysis (FMEA) and the disclosure of adverse events in healthcare.  Leadership 
commitment, professional salience, preoccupation with failure, non-punitive environment, 
systems conducive to error reporting, and strengthening communication were identified as 
important dimensions of a safety culture (Currie, et al., 2009). 
It was not realistic to plan a 60-minute presentation of medication safety for the staff 
nurses on Med/Surg for many reasons, primarily because the education and quality directors 
requested the presentation to be brief since the nurses would be expected to complete the course 
during working hours. The underlying message was to keep the introductory medication safety 
course to less than 15 slides. A very brief, introductory 12-slide PPT presentation was created to 
highlight each of the above concepts. The full slide set for medication safety can be found in 
Appendix B. This PPT presentation was used in conjunction with the “Patient Safety/Risk 
Notifications” PPT presentation developed by the Quality Management staff. An excerpt of the 
slides related to the risk management process and definitions of a medication error, near miss 
event, and hazardous occurrence, which augmented the medication safety slides can be found in 
Appendix C. The plan was to create a series of short self-learning modules about medication 
safety further exploring each concept in more detail. 
Unfortunately, nurses are often not aware that a medication error or near miss event has 
occurred (Choo, Hutchinson & Bucknall, 2010) or what constitutes a medication error 
(Dennison, 2007). One of the main tenets of the project was to provide clear definitions of these 
events and highlight the importance of reporting them in order to identify and key areas for 
improvement within the complex medication delivery system. Another goal was to emphasize 
that the leadership team had a commitment to excellent patient care and patient safety and would 
appreciate the feedback. Dennison (2007) recognized that supportive leadership is crucial in 
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creating practice change using a culture of safety; continuing to blame the individual or expect 
error-free performance is not realistic. A culture of safety will augment the reporting process of 
medication errors and reduce the likelihood that the same type of error will reoccur (Harding & 
Petrick, 2008; Wolf, Hicks, & Serembus, 2006). Benner et al. (2002) identified a concept known 
as practice responsibility; which refers to individual accountability and experiential learning that 
is shared with others to collectively change practice by creating a safer patient care environment. 
Just culture theory is essential when educating nurses about medication safety and how to avoid 
adverse patient outcomes. The plan at the beginning of the project was to expand on these 
concepts through a comprehensive medication safety education program.  
The second step in implementing the educational program was to survey the staff to 
identify current practice when caring for a patient with a PCA device. Gathering these data 
provides a better understanding of the barriers and obstacles that exist. Using an online survey, 
the current knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs regarding the use of PCAs as a means to manage 
postoperative pain can be assessed so the education module can focus on areas of confusion or 
misunderstanding.  
The third step included analyzing these data and developing the simulation scenario. One 
goal of this proposal was to provide a simulation experience in a safe environment highlighting 
the nursing management of a patient with a PCA in order to improve assessment, care, and 
documentation. Developing a simulation scenario is challenging; it requires careful forethought 
and planning, has to be educationally sound, realistic, and based on evidence (Aschenbrenner, 
Milgrom, & Settles, 2012). Although Lu, et al., (2013) reported a statistically significant 
improvement in nurses’ knowledge of high-alert medications after a 60-minute PPT presentation 
was given as the educational intervention, a tailored and innovative education program for nurses 
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was necessary to change the culture and attitudes toward PCA management at this small county 
hospital. Developing a simulation scenario as a educational method would increase the 
mindfulness of critical components of the PCA policy and highlight the common adverse drugs 
events (ADEs) associated with PCAs as well as potential ways an error could be made. When 
learners participate in simulation, they are more likely to be able to quickly adapt to changing 
events and identify evolving patterns in a patient’s condition (Clancy, Effken & Pesut, 2008; 
Glasgow, Dunphy, & Mainous, 2010). Nurses can safely experience a variety of situations that 
put the nurse at risk for committing a medication error or failure to identify ADEs related to PCA 
usage. Being more cognizant of the factors contributing to PCA related errors will enhance 
accountability when caring for a patient with a PCA for the management of postoperative pain.  
The content for the simulation was determined from the surveys and interviews, from 
which specific learning objectives could be developed. Med/Surg nurses were targeted for initial 
implementation due to the frequency of caring for patients on PCAs. There were three different 
concepts for the simulation scenarios that resulted from meetings with the directors from 
education, quality management and pharmacy. The education director wanted a scenario that was 
centered on recognizing a change in the patient’s condition requiring prompt assessment and 
intervention (such as a decreased in respiratory rate or altered level of consciousness); in this 
situation, a rapid response team notification would be appropriate. The quality management 
director requested a scenario that involved an embedded medication error in the scenario in order 
for the nurse to identify the error and complete a risk notification (QRR) using the new online 
risk module. Lastly, the pharmacy director requested a scenario that focused on the key problem 
areas of documentation occurred during change of provider, discontinuing a PCA, when a 
syringe is changed, and when a dose is increased. Scenario development worksheets were 
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created for each of these potential documentation problems (see Appendix D1-D4) because this 
was the area of highest need for the organization. In addition, this decision was based on results 
of direct observational experiences and one to one interviews with nurses where inconsistencies 
were noted regarding when a co-signature was required for documentation of the volume and 
dose infused via the PCA device. Once developed, piloted, and validated, the simulation 
scenarios can be published with the California Simulation Alliance (CSA) as a resource for other 
hospitals to use for PCA education, medication error reporting, and rapid response team 
activation training. 
Aim of entity being changed. The primary goal of the nursing director of the Med/Surg 
floor and the pharmacy director was to improve compliance with PCA documentation. The 
secondary goal of the quality and pharmacy directors was to also increase reporting of near miss 
events. The nursing staff on the Med/Surg unit does not realize they are part of the bigger 
system. They view themselves as somewhat independent or an isolated entity. They generally do 
not feel as though they can make a difference (individually or collectively) or that administration 
will listen to or act on any concerns brought forward. As the beneficiaries of care, the patient was 
never identified as an overt consideration, but rather, an incidental result. The staff nurses 
collectively were more focused on getting the task done. Of course there were some exceptions 
and some nurses put their patient’s needs first. The nursing staff on the unit does not see or 
embrace the notion that they are change agents as a means to improve patient outcomes. For 
example, an over bed trapeze was needed for a patient who was a paraplegic. It took over three 
days to locate all the components of the trapeze and set it up for the patient. Several staff nurses 
were apathetic to the situation and there was no sense of urgency to find the equipment in order 
to improve the patient care experience.  
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The hospital was recently selected to become the area’s Level II trauma center. Staff 
nurses at the hospital recognized this as a milestone and were generally excited about the 
accomplishment. However, the implementation plan for the trauma designation requires specific 
trauma-related education. The education department was focused on providing the education and 
getting the “box checked” that it was done. The impact or change in practice as a result of the 
education was not being evaluated or reinforced because there are no role models on the 
Med/Surg unit to help mentor, support, and encourage sustainable changes in practice.  
Leadership needs. Leadership within the hospital supported this evidence-based change 
in practice project. The previous chief nursing officer (CNO) was involved in the project prior to 
resigning; however, the new CNO was not committed to this project until recently. The 
Med/Surg director was supportive at the very beginning of the proposal; however, she relied 
heavily on the supervising nurse and her staff nurse III’s to help. Unfortunately, these nurses 
were often “too busy”, had conflicting priorities, or were unavailable to help consistently, which 
resulted in several significant project delays. Each director from education, pharmacy, and 
quality were very helpful in the initial stages of the project, however each person had their own 
needs and agendas that prevented their full support and participation. Several organizational 
projects, including a Joint Commission survey and the trauma education, interfered with a 
seamless role out of this evidence-based change in practice project. As a result, the leadership 
needs were only partially met. 
Cost/Benefit Analysis: There is a collaborative relationship between the local college 
and the small county hospital. As a result of this partnership, a partial grant budget of $175,000 
dollars was available for this project proposal as well as pre-established contractual deliverables. 
The complete pro forma operating statement for this project is available in Appendix E for 
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review. Resources required for this project include primarily the time and energy investment of 
the DNP student to create the education module about PCA management, safe medication 
practices, and the simulation scenario. Meetings between the student, education director, 
pharmacy director, quality management director and other relevant parties (selected committee 
members, chief nursing officer, unit based nursing directors, etc.) would occur during their 
working hours, and therefore would not incur additional expenses.  
The DNP student anticipated approximately 300 hours to complete the project. These 
hours are broken down to developing and analyzing the results of the surveys (60 hours), 
researching, creating and implementing the education program (180 hours), and exploring best 
practice, designing a simulation experience, and implementing the simulation exercise (60 
hours). A simulation technician, currently 100% funded through a grant, will be needed each 
time the scenario is run (approximately 60 hours including set up and take down). The supply 
costs are minimal and would include moulage, syringes, intravenous solutions and equipment, 
saline flushes, simulated tablets etc. There will also be costs for the small incentive/gift for each 
nurse who completes the pre and post survey. There is the possibility for the loss of productivity 
to the organization if the survey is completed during working hours. In order to minimize 
disruption to the unit, nurses will likely require compensation to complete the simulation 
scenario during non-working hours. It is estimated that completing the activities would 
necessitate approximately two-three hours of time. Total estimated cost of the intervention is 
$62,368.  
The financial focus of the educational intervention was not to generate revenue, but 
rather, to mitigation risk. Risk-mitigation requires certain assumptions related to frequency and 
cost of errors. It was difficult to obtain accurate costs due to the voluntary nature of reporting 
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adverse drug events (ADEs); actual numbers of ADEs and associated costs are grossly 
underestimated (Pinella, Murillo, Carrasco, & Humet, 2006; Wahr, et al., 2013). Furthermore, an 
independent audit of a small state hospital found much higher rates of medication errors than 
were self-reported by a ratio of 244:1 (Grasso, Rothschild, Jordan, & Jayaram, 2005); this one 
study provides a glimpse into the actual scope of the problem. It is known that there are at least 
1.5 million preventable medication errors and ADEs occur each year in the United States, 
excluding errors of omission (Aspden et al., 2007). Current estimates suggest that hospitalized 
patients are subjected to at least one medication error per day (Aspen, et al., 2007). The 
probability of avoidable ADEs from an injectable medication is 3.3% (Lahue, et al., 2012); 
therefore, the hospital can expect to have 12 events related to injectable medications per year 
(based on the potential for 365 errors/year). The probability of a narcotic/analgesic related ADE 
per occurrence is 0.33% with a 95% confidence interval (Lahue, et al., 2012); this represents 
approximately four events related to narcotics per year. Granted, these are likely to be 
conservative numbers; according to Andel, et al., (2012) preventable medical error (of which 
medications are included) may actually be ten times higher. 
Reported incremental costs of an ADE range from $2,000-$9,000 (AHRQ, 2001; Pinella, 
Murillo, Carrasco, & Humet, 2006; Aspen, Wolcott, Bootman & Cronenwett, 2007; Leapfrog 
Group, 2008; Lahue, et al., 2012); therefore averaging these amounts, the cost of an ADE is 
estimated to be $5,500 in additional costs per hospitalization. This amount is exclusive of 
medical professional liability (MPL), administrative costs, or litigation fees. Additional direct 
costs of an ADE consist of the medical costs to payer (extended length of stay, additional 
medications, physician visits) and lawsuits (Lahue, et al., 2012). The average incremental annual 
costs for preventable ADEs was $600,000 in payer costs, the average annual MPL cost 
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associated with ADEs from injectable medications was $72,000 per hospital, and legal settlement 
costs averaged $376,500 per case (Lahue, et al., 2012). Indirect costs of ADEs may include 
missed work, reduced quality of life or disability for the patient, pain and suffering, and even 
death (Lahue, et al., 2012). Based on quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), a conservative 
estimate of the economic impact of medical errors is calculated with an estimated ten years of 
life lost at an approximate cost of $75,000-$100,000 per year (Andel, et al., 2012). In addition, 
the employee who made the error may call in sick necessitating the inclusion of replacement 
costs to cover the shift. Total estimated cost of savings benefit related to avoiding one 
medication error secondary to a narcotic agent is $487,690; Appendix F has the complete 
cost/benefit analysis. 
Responsibility matrix. The complete responsibility matrix can be located in Appendix 
G. The proposal for the evidence-based change in practice project was presented to the director 
of education, who then requested that the directors from quality management and pharmacy were 
included as well. The project plans were also communicated with the director of the Med/Surg 
unit. Both the quality management and pharmacy directors had a vested interest in increasing the 
near miss event reporting and welcomed the review of the previous fiscal year’s QRRs for an 
unbiased perspective and to identify any trends or patterns if present. Although no specific trends 
were noted, the pharmacy director requested help to determine the reason for non-compliance 
issues related to documentation with new PCA devices the hospital had recently purchased to 
improve patient safety.  Several meetings were conducted with the pharmacy director to ascertain 
the scope of the problem. Within the education department, communication was also maintained 
with a staff nurse III as a liaison to the education director in terms of helping to coordinate the 
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simulation scenarios. The DNP student assumed the majority of the responsibility for these 
aspects of the project.  
The quality management director had the responsibility of implementing a new risk 
module for online reporting and requested assistance to redefine the medication event 
dictionaries to facilitate the reporting process. The DNP student had a supportive role for this 
aspect of the project. Communication needs branched out to include an information technology 
specialist, and members of the nursing informatics clinical expert (NICE) team. Meetings were 
centered on reviewing the new online QRR process as well as updated/redefining the medication 
event dictionaries. In addition, while planning the education for the new online reporting process, 
there was an opportunity to include the first introductory medication safety PowerPoint for 
clinical staff only. The PowerPoint was reviewed by the NICE team and approved for 
distribution.  
Implementation of the Project: 
 In order to start the evidence-based change in practice project, a memorandum of 
understanding was required. Approval from the agency and county counsel for the MOU began 
in April 2013 and was officially signed in late September 2013. Preliminary planning meetings 
occurred between the DNP student and the education director (who was also the student’s 
preceptor at the agency).  During these meetings, the idea of improving medication safety was 
presented as well as improving the incidence of near miss reports. With a conceptual framework 
of “Just Culture”, it was agreed that the project would benefit the staff of the Med/Surg unit and 
the agency as a whole. The idea of a simulation was readily embraced because the hospital had 
just purchased a simulation manikin and was renovating the education department to include a 
MEDICATION SAFETY  38 
simulation suite. April 2014 was the scheduled timeline for the simulation manikin to arrive and 
the simulation suite to become fully operational.  
 The director of education helped to coordinate a few meetings with the pharmacy and 
quality management directors because they each had a vested interest in this project. Between 
October and November 2013, 604 medication-related QRRs were reviewed and analyzed for 
trends and patterns. To obtain further insight into the scope of the problem, the DNP student 
attended a couple of meetings specific to evaluating medication events, including one in which 
the results of the annual Medication Error Reduction Program (MERP) were reported.  
 During November 2103 and January 2014, the DNP student was actively involved in 
meeting with quality management, information technology, pharmacy, and the NICE team to 
learn and review the online QRR reporting process, which was scheduled to go live in February 
2014. Suggestions were made to improve the reporting process as well as providing 
recommendation for a new medication event dictionary. The original medication event dictionary 
consisted of 56 entries; this was streamlined to 8 new categories and 33 subcategories (see 
Appendix A). The introductory PowerPoint on medication safety was prepared for the clinical 
staff and reviewed by the team for approval to be used in conjunction with the education for the 
new risk notification process that was being implemented in February 2014.  
 During January 2014 to February 2014, there were three meetings with the pharmacy 
director to gain understanding of the PCA issues the department was experiencing. Initial reports 
from the pharmacy director indicated that the nurses on Med/Surg were not following the new 
policy regarding the frequency of assessments that were being documented. A couple members 
of the NICE team were included in these meetings in order to get a nursing perspective on the 
scope of the problem. In early February, the DNP student was scheduled for a training session 
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with members from the NICE team to learn how to operate the PCA pump and shown the 
required documentation steps. Once the DNP student became comfortable with the PCA pumps, 
the observations and interviews with the Med/Surg staff nurses regarding their current practice 
while caring for patients with a PCA device was able to commence. A new orthopedic surgery 
service was started in the spring 2014, so there were many hopes that patients with PCAs would 
be available (status post a total knee or hip replacement).  
The purpose of the observations and interviews were two fold: 1) to gather data regarding 
current practice with PCA devices and 2) to provide “just in time” education to those interviewed 
who were not fully aware or complying to the policy. Unfortunately, there were many challenges 
in scheduling because the floor did not consistently have patients with a PCA pump; 
furthermore, when patients were present on the unit, the DNP student was not able to be at the 
hospital due to conflicts with the student’s full-time work schedule. Over the course of six 
weeks, a total of four nurses were observed and interviewed regarding their care of the patient 
with a PCA.  
The few observations did not add much insight to the issue. The nurses who were most 
comfortable caring for patients with a PCA device, were also the one who were the most familiar 
with the policy and therefore compliant with the established documentation requirements. The 
goal was to focus the education on the nurses who did not consistently care for patients with a 
PCA.  In March 2014, an online survey was created to assess the current knowledge, attitudes, 
and beliefs regarding the use of PCAs as a means to manage postoperative pain. Once the first 
draft was complete, the survey was sent via email to the hospital’s librarian, who was considered 
to be a Survey Monkey expert. A meeting was scheduled with the librarian to review the survey 
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and obtain feedback on the survey questions (see Appendix H). The survey was live for a period 
of three weeks from March 23rd – April 10th.  
The results of the survey were analyzed by the end of April. Initial attempts to schedule 
meetings with the education, pharmacy and quality management directors to provide the results 
of the survey were unsuccessful, due to competing priorities with hospital projects or vacation 
time. A meeting was eventually scheduled with the education director at the beginning of June. 
During the meeting, the survey results were reported and a request was placed to get a copy of 
the results from the medication safety course on Healthstream©. This is when the 
implementation plan for the project got off track and then continued to deteriorate.  
During the months from mid-June to September, two-way communication and 
collaboration between the agency and the DNP student came to a standstill. In July and August, 
four attempts were made to obtain the results of the medication safety course on Healthstream© 
from the education department; the results were finally obtained at the beginning of September. 
The explanations for the delay was the result of staff turnover in the education department, so no 
one was sure how to access or where to find the results.  
In July, August, and September, several emails and phone calls to pharmacy and quality 
management were made to obtain the financial information regarding the cost of a medication 
error, litigation costs, and fees for Medical Professional Liability (MPL) insurance to estimate a 
possible return on investment. In addition, during the time period, the DNP student requested 
updated information about PCA use on the Med/Surg unit (to include results of the PCA audits 
completed by pharmacy), pharmacy reports regarding PCA and naloxone (Narcan) concomitant 
use, as well as the number of rapid response team (RRT) calls that may be related to PCA use. 
Lastly, requests were made for any adverse drug event (ADE) reports associated with PCAs, 
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updated medication error and near miss event rates for FY2014, and number of occurrences of 
medication delivery on Med/Surg (specifically injectable medications). This information was 
needed to develop the simulation scenario that was specific to the identified deficit and to meet 
the needs of the pharmacy director. The only emails that were received from the agency during 
the specified time period were automatically generated “out of office” notifications due to 
scheduled vacations.  
In September, one email was received from the pharmacy director indicating that 
documentation was the main problem for the nurses when caring for patients with PCA devices; 
however, the email lacked any specific details. Also, the results of the Healthstream© course 
were received around the same time and efforts were made to move forward with the simulation 
scenario. Several draft scenario development worksheets (Appendix D1-D4) were created 
because without specific data from pharmacy or access to the PCA audits, it was difficult to 
determine the exact documentation issue that was most problematic.  
Support was requested and received from the Med/Surg director; the DNP student was 
directed to work closely with the staff nurse III on the Med/Surg floor to determine the unit’s 
perspective and their specific needs and gaps with PCA documentation. The Med/Surg director 
also warned the DNP student that the staff nurses were difficult to get motivated. During this 
time, the staff nurse III on the Med/Surg unit was very busy and did not respond quickly to email 
and could not be reached by phone. Several attempts were made to schedule days to review, pilot 
and validate the simulation scenario; three days were scheduled but each day was cancelled by 
the staff nurse III. By the end of the month, the DNP student had received a message that the 
staff nurse III was on vacation until mid-October. The DNP student then contacted the 
supervising nurse who was able to provide some assistance.  
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On October 6th, a meeting was finally scheduled with the directors from pharmacy, 
quality management and education. At this time, much of the data previously requested was 
provided, but not all. Unfortunately, the actual QRR data reported using the new online module 
was not released to the DNP student.  No financial information was available regarding costs of 
medication error or from lawsuits because the primary patients served by the hospital is not a 
litigious population. The quality management recalls the hospital being sued twice in the past 20 
years, with each settlement being less than $100,000. Furthermore, all of the directors were 
unaware of the exact nursing workflow with the PCAs to be able to provide any feedback on the 
draft simulation scenarios.  
Lastly, the simulation suite was still in progress; the manikin had arrived, the suite was 
built, but the hospital was waiting for the audio/visual equipment to be installed. The DNP 
student already anticipated this and alternate plans were being made to conduct the simulations 
in situ on the actual Med/Surg unit. Final attempts were made on Oct 8th and 9th to pilot the 
scenario, but the supervising nurse was not available to help on those days. At this time, the DNP 
student made a very difficult decision to cease further attempts to implement the remainder of 
the project due to time constraints and a project due date of October 15th.  
Planning the study of the intervention: 
Assessment plans. Using the PDSA cycle, the first test of change was the introductory 
medication safety education course placed on Healthstream©. This course was assigned only to 
the clinical staff in the hospital. Upon completion of the course, staff nurses are expected to pass 
the post-test with a score of 80% or better. Due to a miscommunication, the quality management 
staff developed the post-test. After the introductory medication safety education course was 
created, there was uncertainty if approval was granted to place the course on Healthstream©. The 
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DNP student had the impression the course was not going to be used, so post-test questions were 
not written. Nevertheless, upon realizing the course was in fact being used, the DNP student 
planned to obtain the results of the post-test to determine knowledge gaps specific to the nurses 
working on the Med/Surg unit. In addition, the number of medication events being reported, 
from February to September 2014, would be compared to the preceding time period.     
The second test of change was focused on improving compliance regarding PCA 
documentation and increasing the number of near miss events being reported. Initial plans were 
to collect data (between January and March) from one on one interviews, nurse observations, the 
Healthstream© course results, and the needs assessment to create a targeted simulation scenario 
to address the practice deficiencies with the PCAs (which were later identified to be 
documentation issues). The needs assessment consisted of 20 questions (see Appendix H) related 
to the policy and procedure as well as nurse comfort in caring for patients with a PCA device. 
Planned simulation exercises were to be conducted in April, either in the education department if 
the simulation equipment was ready or in situ on the actual Med/Surg unit. The simulation was 
expected to be approximately 15-20 minutes in length including pre-brief and debrief. The 
anticipated outcome of the simulation exercise was 1) increase awareness of the need to report 
near miss events and 2) improved compliance with PCA documentation requirements. 
Administration of the needs assessment survey was scheduled as a follow up to the first one to 
compare results after participation in the simulation scenarios.  
 Gap analysis. The current clinical state and baseline data prior to implementing the 
evidence-based change in practice project revealed a few gaps in practice. The pharmacy director 
stated there were gaps with near miss reporting, which resulted in a deficiency in their annual 
MERP reporting. An issue regarding the clinical practice of nurses while using PCA devices was 
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noted. According to the pharmacy director, approximately 1/3 of nurses were not documenting 
on the PCA intervention EHR screens appropriately. In addition, the pharmacy director also 
reported an increase in the number of adverse drug reaction reports related to opioids (morphine 
specifically). See Appendix I for complete gap analysis.  
 Gantt chart. A Gantt chart of the entire project can be found in Appendix J. This chart 
shows the original and updated timeline for this evidence-based change in practice project as a 
result of multiple delays from several unexpected obstacles. Initial milestones are indicated as 
well as actual dates of completion. There were four sub-projects that made up the entire project. 
Per the responsibility matrix, not all steps of the project were the sole responsibility of the DNP 
student; for instance, the actual implementation of the online reporting module was identified as 
agency responsibility. Developing the medication safety education self-learning module, 
determining the scope of the PCA noncompliance issue and creating the simulation experience 
were the DNP student’s responsibility. 
Nature of initial process change planned. The nurses on Med/Surg were directly 
connected with this activity. A “natural” work group was not evident on the unit because the 
floor nurses had variable schedules. It was hoped that the Med/Surg staff nurse III would have a 
vested interest in helping the DNP student to solicit volunteers for the simulation scenario and be 
available on the unit to ensure patient needs were still met when a nurse came to the simulation 
experience for 15-20 minutes; however, the staff nurse III was not very comfortable or 
knowledgeable about the PCA pumps and was not willing to help during implementation of the 
evidence-based change in practice project.  
 Leading the change. The DNP student was expected to lead the effort to implement the 
evidence-based change in practice project for the majority of the project.  The director of 
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education, quality management, and pharmacy were available for support, encouragement, and 
guidance. With no previous project management or formal leadership experience, the DNP 
student expected some challenges with the implementation of the project. Because the agency is 
also a teaching hospital, the DNP student felt the environment would be conducive to learning as 
a result of the collaborative relationship with their university affiliate. Also, nurses would likely 
be more receptive to learning about new strategies to improve patient outcomes as a result their 
own work processes. The DNP student was curious about which educational methodology would 
be the best to produce a change in behavior. The change of behavior would be measured in 
increased compliance with vital sign documentation for patients on PCAs and an increase in the 
number of near miss medication reports. There were plenty of resources available from the 
various directors being very willingness to assist in the project to the availability of the actual 
equipment needed for the simulation experience.  
Methods of Evaluation and Analysis: 
 Instruments used, analytic methods, and software used.  Several assessment strategies 
were utilized when evaluating the effectiveness of the implementation. Post-tests from the 
Healthstream© course were used to determine baseline understanding of medication safety for 
the nurses on Med/Surg. Although the DNP student did not participate in developing the post-
test questions, several questions were still relevant. Unfortunately, the DNP student was only 
able to obtain these results as an aggregate; responses to individual questions were not available. 
The needs assessment was conducted through an online Survey Monkey© and generated a 
variety of descriptive results, including nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio measurement 
variables. Survey Monkey© was also planned for the post-simulation/reflection evaluation 
surveys (see Appendix K for full post-simulation evaluation questions).  Plans for full 
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implementation of the self-learning module are still being finalized. If the DNP student is 
permitted to place the learning modules on Healthstream©, then that platform would be used to 
evaluate the pre/post-tests for initial results. Then the DNP student would compare the results 
between the two and determine the amount of improvement using simple ratios. Otherwise, the 
DNP student will construct the self-learning module on paper, and use a Scantron© or 
paper/pencil format to collect the results. All of the instruments and surveys were created by the 
DNP student with the exception of the post-test for the introductory medication safety education 
course on Healthstream©, which was developed by the quality management department.  
 SWOT analysis. Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats are fully described in 
Appendix L. The strength of the education program is the multidisciplinary support received 
from the directors of the Med/Surg unit, pharmacy, education, and quality management; the 
previous interim chief nursing officer (CNO) supported the intervention as well. However, the 
biggest weakness and threat is the potential resistance, lack of support and cooperation from the 
individual staff nurses. Without a culture of safety, nurses may feel threatened or fear a negative 
performance review. Perhaps a bigger threat is trying to schedule time for nurses to attend the 
simulation experience. There are opportunities to market and publish the simulation scenario and 
education module. 
 Return on investment. A break-even analysis was difficult to measure for an 
educational intervention. Education is often the first to be limited or eliminated when hospitals 
look at their bottom line because it is considered “non-productive” time; adding training hours is 
met with resistance (Zigmont, 2014). In addition, participants must have the desire to learn with 
the right climate to transfer the new knowledge (Dennison, 2007). The goal of the educational 
intervention was to avoid adverse outcomes, thereby preventing any additional costs to the 
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organization related to uncompensated expenses, increases in MPL fees, or litigation expenses. 
Specific details outlining the cost/benefit analysis were previously discussed in the Methods 
section of this paper (also see Appendix F). Many assumptions were required since financial data 
for the agency were not available. Direct, indirect and incremental costs were estimated based on 
the available literature about medication errors.  
The presentation of options for the business plan proposal can be found in Appendix M, 
the operating statement is available in Appendix E, and the cost/benefit analysis is found in 
Appendix F. With respect to financial forecasting, if more occurrences are prevented, then the 
cost savings will increase. Medication error and ADE rates can be evaluated quarterly for the 
number of near miss reports and ADEs, change in MPL and payer costs, as well as legal fees. 
Sustainability can be established with annual competency testing or simulation exercises to keep 
nurses mindful of safe medication practices.   
In terms of ADEs, the quantity represents the number of occurrences that need to be 
avoided in order to realize a return on investment. The fixed cost for implementing the education 
module and simulation experience for nurses to enhance their knowledge and understanding of 
caring for patients with patient-controlled analgesic devices is found on the operating statement 
($62,368). In terms of preventing adverse outcomes, the price can be assumed to be the average 
cost of an ADE, annual payer and MPL costs associated with narcotic injectable ADEs, legal 
settlement costs and indirect costs ($487,690). Therefore, the hospital would need to avoid only 
one occurrence as a result of the educational intervention in order to break even. When totaled, 
for a moderate estimate for four events, the average additional cost per year is $1,928,760, 
resulting in an ROI of 30% when conservative direct and indirect costs are included (see 
Appendix N for full explanation of the Return on Investment and Break-Even Analysis).  
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 Conceptual and operational definitions. The operational definitions of medication 
occurrences were included in the staff training PPT created by the quality management 
department. The hospital describes the different types of occurrences as:  
 Error:  An unintended event or act.  This can be something that was done or something 
that should have been done but wasn’t. 
 Near Miss:  An event that was “caught” and caused no harm, but for which a recurrence 
carries a significant chance of harm. 
 Hazardous Condition:  Any set of circumstances, which significantly increase the 
likelihood of a serious adverse outcome. 
Despite these definitions, there was evidence from review of the QRRs that some degree of 
confusion or misunderstanding existed as near miss events were categorized as errors. The 
quality management director acknowledged the problem and realized that some of the 
medication event categories are actually near miss events and also indicated that the data are 
based on how the person entering the data choose to categorize the event.  
Section IV: Results 
Program Evaluation: 
 Nature of setting and improvement intervention. The Med/Surg unit operates with an 
average daily census of 22-24 patients on a 33-bed floor. The nurses administer approximately 
14 medications per patient per day according to pharmacy. The incidence of PCA use on 
Med/Surg is outlined in table two. Data were requested in July 2014 regarding concomitant use 
of naloxone (Narcan) and a patient receiving analgesic via PCA device, but at the time of this 
writing, the report from pharmacy for patients receiving both PCA and Narcan was not provided 
to the DNP student. The quality management department reported no rapid response team calls 
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as a result of respiratory depression or arrest secondary to PCA use. Both reports were requested 
within the time frame from October 2013 to September 2014.  
 Medical/Surgical Unit 
# of PCA patients/day 2.7 
# of patients started on a PCA/day 0.45 
# of syringes used/average patient 3.83 
PCA=Patient Controlled Analgesia 
Table 2: Incidence of PCA use. 
 
Both AIM statements could not be measured within the specified time period. The first 
AIM statement suggested that the number of QRR reports would increase by 10% after the 
educational intervention. Unfortunately, there were discrepancies noted in the way QRRs were 
categorized; with the new online reporting module, several near miss event categories were 
labeled erroneously as a medication error. Actual error reports were not made available to the 
DNP student; however, when a near miss report was generated, the results produced only four 
entries from February to September. However, without actual baseline data and the confusion 
between near miss events and medication event categories, the DNP student was not able to 
determine the actual increase in the number of QRR events being reported. Despite providing 
clear definitions of the categories of medication events in the educational PPT, a change of 
behavior was not measurable. 
The second AIM statement proposed a 50% increase in PCA documentation compliance. 
The compliance issues regarding PCA documentation were discussed with the pharmacy director 
prior to implementing the project; however, a baseline compliance level could not be established 
and comparisons could not be made because chart audits were not made available to the DNP 
student. Results of the needs assessment related to PCA use were presented to the nursing staff at 
scheduled staff meetings. Nurses appeared surprised to learn they were over documenting on 
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some parameters and under documenting on others. See Appendix P for the handout provided to 
the nurses at the staff meeting.  
Another contextual factor of the implementation was working with three additional 
directors (education, quality management, and pharmacy). The DNP student often felt conflicted 
in establishing priorities based on each director’s needs. In retrospect, it would have been 
beneficial to coordinate communications with just one person; however, due to the obstacles 
experienced with communication, it is hypothesized that the project would have experienced 
even more delays. On the positive side, working with all three directors provided the DNP 
student with an interesting perspective of the entire operations within the agency.  
Evolution of initial improvement plan. The project was forced to evolve over time due 
to delays in acquiring the necessary information (i.e. results of the Healthstream post-test and 
results from the PCA audits). Only one small portion of the project was implemented in a timely 
fashion because the agency had a firm “go live” date for the new risk module for online QRR 
reporting. Even this part of the project was not without difficulties. As previously mentioned, the 
DNP student was told the medication safety education course, when added to the training for the 
risk module, would be too long for the staff to complete and therefore not be used. The DNP 
student learned in late February that the medication safety education course was a requirement 
for the nursing staff to complete.  
Education regarding the documentation requirements while caring for patients with a 
PCA device was challenging as well. It was difficult to determine the exact nature and scope of 
the problem. According to the pharmacy director, chart audits on PCA documentation indicated 
that nurses were not meeting requirements of the policy and the hospital received a Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) alert indicating that documentation of patient 
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assessments and vital signs was not consistent with the current policy. The needs assessment 
survey was created to determine the current level of knowledge and understanding with the new 
PCA policy and documentation requirements. The DNP student was not able to provide real time 
education about the PCAs because of delays in coordinating schedules to learn how the PCA 
pump operates and the expected documentation requirements. In addition, often times, the DNP 
student was not available at the same time a patient with a PCA device was admitted to the 
Med/Surg floor. Furthermore, “super users” on the unit as well as from members of the NICE 
team were providing additional PCA training without any coordination with the DNP student.  
Creating the simulation scenario was delayed until specific data was obtained about the 
PCA documentation problem as stated by pharmacy. Results of PCA chart audits and baseline 
compliance rates were not made available to the DNP student. Despite not having the 
information, the DNP student continued to develop drafts of scenarios based on a variety of 
possible documentation issues. Additional delays were experienced when the staff nurse III and 
supervising nurse on Med/Surg were not available to help pilot or validate the scenarios. This 
was an example of another pattern of care identified earlier; nurses on Med/Surg have the 
perception that things are being done to them, that they are being forced to change their habits 
without realizing that patient care and safety are at stake.  
Change in care process. Regrettably, patient care was not changed during the 
implementation of the evidence-based change in practice project. The results of the medication 
safety education course on Healthstream© demonstrated that 49/51 (96%) staff nurses assigned 
to Med/Surg successfully completed the course; completion of the course was mandatory as 
determined by the quality management department. Of the nurses who completed the course, 
29/49 (59.2%) scored 100%, 12/49 (24.5%) obtained a score of 90%, and  8/49 (16.3%) achieved 
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an overall score of 80% (which was the minimum required to pass the course). Upon further 
analysis, the above scores were all acquired on the first attempt to complete the course.  
Forty-three percent of the nursing staff participated in the online needs assessment about 
the PCA policy and comfort level in operating the pumps. The results of the survey indicated 
only 37% of the staff nurses were very comfortable operating the pumps and 32% were very 
familiar with the current PCA policy. With greater than 60% of the staff being moderately 
comfortable/familiar or not at all comfortable/familiar, there was an opportunity to increase not 
only the familiarity with the PCA policy, but also the comfort level when working with the PCA 
infusion pumps. When analyzing the assessment frequency data specific to the PCA policy, 
results indicated that the staff actually over-assess their patients’ vital signs on initiation of the 
PCA pump, with dose increases, and during PCA therapy in terms of how often each parameter 
is being measured. Some possible explanations for the differences in responses could be 
confusion in the way the question was asked or not reading the question correctly. Pertinent 
results of the needs assessment regarding PCA use can be found in Appendix O. 
  System/process failures. One process failure came with the construction of the needs 
assessment survey itself. All of the questions were voluntary to answer; the hope was that the 
nurses would elect to answer the questions willingly. In hindsight, this decision was likely a 
mistake. Almost half of the nurses responding skipped the majority of the questions. This could 
be because they were interrupted due to patient care needs, they elected not to answer the 
questions or they were unfamiliar with the policy and didn’t want to answer incorrectly.  In 
contrast, 100% of nurses answered the first two demographic questions in terms of years of 
nursing experience and specifically, how long they worked on the Med/Surg floor. In addition, 
the responses to frequency of monitoring were likely confusing to the nurses responding. For 
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example, the frequency of monitoring for a dose increase is every 15 minutes times two, then the 
expected frequency of monitoring is every two hours; based on the responses to this question, 
only 25% selected the every two hours option. A possible explanation for these results is that the 
nurses most likely selected the vital sign monitoring specific to the dose increase, and did not 
also select the frequency of on-going monitoring.   
One important result that was noted provides an opportunity for the hospital to collect 
better information on the number of medication errors and near miss events. According to 
Stratton, Blegen, Pepper, and Vaughn (2004), the national average of the number of medication 
errors per 1000 patient days was 5.66 in adult acute care units. At this agency, the medication 
error data was not reported in the same manner; however, total numbers of patient days were 
available allowing the DNP student to calculate the error rate per 1000 patient days as a means of 
comparison. As reported in Table 1, the average number of medication related QRRs for fiscal 
year 2013 (July 2012-June 2013) calculated per 1000 patient days were 15.35 and 11.26 for the 
2014 fiscal year. This number is much higher than the national average because it is believed to 
have near miss events being reported as medication errors, when in fact, the error never actually 
reached the patient.  
Section V: Discussion 
Summary: 
Key successes and difficulties. The success of this evidence-based change in practice 
project was the experience the DNP student gained from planning, implementing and evaluating 
a project of this scope and breadth. The opportunity to work with the three directors from 
education, quality management and pharmacy allowed for a much broader perspective of the 
agency’s operations and processes and provided access to multiple areas of the hospital. 
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However, communication was a barrier due to many scheduling conflicts; only a few meetings 
were scheduled and most of the communication was via email or phone messages. Nevertheless, 
the opportunity to understand the scope of the problem, from different departments, with PCA 
documentation was incredibly valuable to examine the macrosystem functioning of the 
organization and to begin to understand the complexity of the documentation process.   
Although no changes in care delivery were directly observed, the DNP student was able 
to begin to raise awareness of the importance of reporting actual and near miss medication events 
in order to make the medication administration process safer for patients. Another success of the 
project was to identify and clarify the frequency of PCA vital sign monitoring expectations per 
the hospital’s policy and procedure. The strength of the project was the thoroughness of the 
investigation to examine the scope of the issue and to determine the correct androgogical 
methodology to provide a comprehensive educational experience in order to change clinical 
practice. The educational plan did not include a “one size fits all” approach, but rather, the 
education was tailored to the specific needs of the Med/Surg unit. The absence of timely 
feedback to determine the effectiveness of one intervention before testing another method 
hindered the implementation of the project; as a result, the DNP student could not obtain updated 
information to evaluate the scope of the practice change.  
One major difficulty experienced was the timeliness of the information received from the 
various departments. Two-way communication stopped over the summer months (June-October) 
for a variety of reasons, some known and unknown. What was known about the lack of 
communication was that either the quality management director or the pharmacy director were 
on vacation and not available at various and multiple times during that period. In addition, there 
were staffing turnovers in the education department as well that delayed obtaining the results of 
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the Healthstream© module and learning the questions that were used for the post-test.  Another 
area of difficulty was the cessation of free-flowing information and collaboration. A lot of data 
was shared with the DNP student in the early stages of the project; however, when additional 
data was requested (from June-October), the data was no longer being provided or shared as 
willingly.  
 Lessons learned. There were several organizational and personal lessons learned. Key 
findings from the needs assessment survey demonstrated a discrepancy in actual clinical 
practices of obtaining vital signs for patients with a PCA device when compared to the policy. It 
was important to learn that nurses were over documenting in regards to the frequency on some 
parameters, and conversely under documenting on other requirements. In order to sustain the 
gain in knowledge regarding the frequency of vital sign documentation, small, laminated cards 
will be provided to the nurses on the Med/Surg unit (that can be worn on their badges) for a 
quick reminder.  
Documentation for the previous PCA devices was on paper (doctor orders and 
documentation); the manually tracking of the previous paper documentation method made it 
easier to make the drug dosage and volume totals add up because of the paper trail. The new 
online documentation was supposed to allow for better tracking of narcotic usage, but the 
integration of the PCA pump and the EHR was not fully understood.  It would appear as though 
whole narcotic syringes had gone missing because of the inconsistent documentation practices by 
some nurses. The problem was a global one and could not be tracked to a few people. This raises 
obvious concerns from the pharmacy director’s perspective: are nurses diverting narcotics or just 
not documenting accurately?  
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Change in knowledge doesn’t always produce a change in behavior. The PDSA cycle was 
intended to implement small tests of change. Different andragogical approaches were used to 
determine the most effective method to educate the staff nurses. Three tests of change were 
planned: 1) PPT presentation on Healthstream© with post-test for introductory medication safety 
education information, 2) survey about current PCA practice, and 3) a simulation experience was 
planned as an interactive, hands on, active learning. Since the approval to pay nurses to come in 
for the simulations was denied, simulations would need to be done during working hours and 
would result in competing patient care priorities. As a result, simulations were planned to be 
completed on site rather than use the local college’s simulation lab. The hospital had expected 
their simulation lab to be up and running by April 2014; as of October 2014, the lab was still not 
fully operational.   
Failing to identify the informal leaders of the Med/Surg unit was an important personal 
lesson learned. The DNP student relied heavily on support from the formal leadership of the unit 
to propel the project forward. Had the informal leaders of the unit been identified early, these 
nurses could have been very helpful in championing the project to encourage participation and 
promote change. Another personal lesson learned was that passion about something (in this case, 
medication safety), does not translate to universal buy in from others. More importantly, passion 
is not enough to encourage others to be more interested in learning more about the subject.  
Lastly, even with sound teaching strategies, an educator cannot change behavior alone; that 
responsibility is that of the learner. According to Plutarch, “Education is not the filling of a pail, 
but the lighting of a fire” (often misattributed to William Butler Yeats). This quote exemplifies 
the need to find the right educational approach for the right nurse at the right time; something 
that hospital organizations generally do not have the luxury of time or money to do.   
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 New possibilities. As previously discussed, the medication error rate per 1000 patient 
days is much higher at this agency then compared to the national average. It is assumed that near 
miss events are actually being categorized as medication errors. The evidence for this assumption 
is in the Healthstream post-test for the medication safety course. The question asked, “If a 
medication is filled wrong in the Pyxis, what type of Med Event would that fall under when you 
report this safety issue in Meditech?” The options were Administration Issues, Drug Events, or 
Pharmacy Issue. In addition to being a pharmacy issue, the more accurate answer to this question 
is that the safety issue should be reported as a near miss (but, this was not one of the options). By 
cross-referencing the medication event categories with those that are near misses, more accurate 
data can be collected.  When re-examining the medication event categories, there is an 
opportunity to flag some of the categories as near miss events; a couple examples include: 
pharmacy issues, Medication Administration Record (MAR) issues, and narcotic/count issues. 
 Another possibility that emerged as a result of this evidence-based change in practice 
project was centered on recognizing the system factors affecting the timely documentation when 
caring for patients on PCA devices. For example, when sharing the scenario development 
worksheets for the simulation exercise, both the quality management and pharmacy directors 
could not comment on the scenario because they both did not fully understand the nursing 
workflow process involved for the required PCA documentation.  
Implications. Education is not the same thing as learning (Zigmont, 2014). Furthermore, 
learning (in contrast to education or ‘seat time’) has a measurable outcome in terms of better 
patient outcomes, improving work environment and customer service (Zigmont, 2014). Zigmont 
argues that the most efficient way to educate people is to fill a classroom, whereas the most 
effective (and most expensive) method for learning is small group simulation experiences 
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(2014). Learning must be a priority that comes with the appropriate investment in time and 
dollars. A philosophical shift is needed to support learning in order to improve patient 
satisfaction and patient outcomes. In addition, participants must have the desire to learn with the 
right climate to transfer new knowledge (Dennison, 2007).  
 Dissemination plan. The results of the needs assessment was presented during scheduled 
staff meetings on the Med/Surg unit and distributed by email for nurses who were not in 
attendance. Approximately 25 nurses attended the staff meetings and were give a copy of the 
results as well as a page of frequently asked questions (FAQs) regarding medication safety (see 
Appendix P for the handout provided to the staff nurses). The FAQs provided an additional 
opportunity to reinforce the definition of a near miss event and the importance of reporting both 
systems and human issued contributing to either near misses or actual medication errors. Results 
of the needs assessment and analysis of the Healthstream© post-test were also given to each 
director with key lessons learned, suggestions for improvement, and strategies to overcome 
obstacles.  
Relation to other evidence: 
 Comparison to previous studies. Very few research articles were discovered on 
medication errors made by nurses; most of the articles were literature reviews to determine the 
scope of the problem. See Appendix Q for summary of specific articles related to medication 
safety education programs that were reviewed and how they were rated.  
Leufer and Cleary-Holdforth (2013) conducted a literature review to determine the extent 
and severity of the problem of medication errors and the contributing factors. Medication safety 
curricula should be focused on the fundamental concepts of medication administration to ensure 
the highest level of safety (Leufer & Cleary-Holdforth, 2013). In addition, the complex processes 
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of prescription, calculation, constitution, checking, administration, patient assessment, 
documentation, and patient medication education should be addressed in the curricula (Leufer & 
Cleary-Holdforth, 2013). Extrinsic problems, such as workload, staffing ratio, skill mix, number 
of patients and patient acuity involve issues outside of the nurse’s direct control (Leufer & 
Cleary-Holdforth, 2013).  Whereas, problems related to knowledge deficit, practice deficit, math 
skills, inattention and distraction are examples of intrinsic issues within the nurse’s control 
(Leufer & Cleary-Holdforth, 2013).   
Previous studies presented mixed results. A randomized control trial by Lu et al., (2013) 
reported that using a 60-minute PPT presentation was an effective method of providing 
education as demonstrated by statistically significant increases in test scores post intervention. 
Sears, Goldsworthy, and Goodman (2010) also conducted a randomized control trial and 
reported fewer errors in the simulation intervention group compared to the control group 
indicating that a simulation-based education method was effective in changing practice by 
reducing the number of medication errors committed during the simulation exercise. Lastly, 
Dennison (2007) conducted a quasi-experimental study and reported a statistically significant 
increase in test scores after two 30-minutes computer modules about medication safety without a 
corresponding change in behavior. 
 Similarities/differences. This evidence-based change in practice project encompassed 
the tenets of previous studies and articles published about medication safety. Education programs 
are a convenient method for disseminating information about complex system issues to a large 
number of nurses. The literature consistently indicated that education programs should include 
clear definitions, reporting process for medication events, the importance of disclosure, and an 
overview of patient safety principles that include examples of system and human factors, as well 
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as an emphasis on culture of safety philosophy and leadership commitment. The PPT and 
simulation exercise for this project included definitions of near miss and medication error, 
human and system factors that contribute to medication errors. In addition, knowledge level of 
the pharmacokinetics of opioids (i.e. Morphine) to reduce the risk of respiratory depression with 
its use in PCA devices was surveyed. Concepts of a safety culture was explored with each 
director and reiterated with the Med/Surg staff to emphasize the importance of near miss 
reporting. These same methods (a computer based educational self-learning module and 
simulation exercises) were used in this project; however one major difference was that both 
educational modalities were used sequentially to change practice and not just to evaluate an 
increase in test scores.  
Barriers to Implementation: 
Bias. External factors were not fully considered when implementing this project and 
contribute to confounding biases. The hospital continued to provide training about the PCA 
pumps from “super users” and members of the NICE team independent of the strategy the DNP 
student was trying to implement to improve PCA documentation. As a result, it will be difficult 
to determine if the behavioral change was a result of the evidence-based change in practice 
project or the educational efforts of the hospital.  
Known barriers. An obstacle that could not have been anticipated was the hospital’s 
selection for Level II trauma designation. The implementation plan to obtain full designation 
required extensive amount of education related to trauma to prepare the entire staff in caring for 
these more complex patients. In addition, The Joint Commission had a site visit in September 
2014, which impeded implementation of the evidence-based change in practice project because 
of the focus and attention the survey required.  
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 Locally held assumptions. A few assumptions were evident among the staff nurses and 
the directors (pharmacy, education, quality management, Med/Surg). The staff nurses’ reported 
feeling that administration makes them do certain things, they object to extra duties imposed on 
them, and feel overwhelmed and resistant to change. Many shortcuts and work-arounds were 
directly observed on the unit; when these issues are brought to the nurse’s attention, the response 
was centered on not having enough time or resources to do their job. There was no awareness or 
acknowledgement of the impact the work-arounds had on patient safety. These assumptions were 
complicated by the mixed message from the administration of the hospital in that education fixes 
everything. There is often a knee-jerk reaction to educate the masses, but without taking the time 
to do it right and determining the root cause of the problem. 
Interpretation: 
 There were many competing commitments during the implementation of this project. The 
hospital was committed to offering mandatory trauma education due to being selected as the 
local trauma center; full designation of Level II trauma status is expected in December 2014. The 
quality management director was working on several other projects, the education director was 
focused on coordinating the trauma education and developing the simulation lab, and the 
pharmacy director was preparing for the annual Medication Error Reduction Program (MERP) 
report. As a result of these competing commitments, the project could not be implemented within 
the established time frame and expected outcomes could not be fully observed.  
 The most important aspect of the implementation plan was conducting the simulation 
exercises to promote a change in practice was hindered because the simulation lab was not fully 
operational within the original timeframe proposed by the hospital. There was an initial 
agreement to pay the nurses to participate in the simulation activity. Original plans had the 
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nurses going to the local college to use their simulation lab (until the hospital’s lab was fully 
operational). The decision was then changed to have the nurses complete the simulation exercise 
during working hours, despite not having the simulation lab ready.  
The leadership did not agree with the need for change in terms of reducing costs 
associated with medication errors. The DNP student learned in October 2014 that the population 
served by the hospital is not a litigious one; the quality management director reported only one 
lawsuit that resulted in a settlement of less than $100,000 in the 20 years of employment at the 
hospital. Nevertheless, insights were provided into the process of PCA documentation and near 
miss reporting that could help improve the system in which the nurses work.  
Conclusions: 
 Requiring a specified amount of education about medication safety is the quickest, 
easiest, and most cost effect way to address the issue; however, the outcomes do not always 
demonstrate a change in behavior. Increasing awareness of the human and system factors 
contributing to medication errors was an important goal to improve the system in which nurses 
administer medications. Streamlining the medication events for the online reporting tool will 
hopefully increase the convenience of reporting and enable more nurses to document both near 
miss events and actual medication errors. The needs assessment to establish baseline PCA 
knowledge clearly demonstrated an area for improvement as nurses, overall, indicated they were 
only moderately comfortable with PCA devices. The intervention of combining didactic content 
and a simulation activity is still useful as a means to change practice in terms of reporting more 
near miss events and improving PCA documentation. A greater commitment from leadership is 
necessary to sustain practice changes in order to improve patient outcomes. The DNP student 
still plans to implement the simulation scenarios when the hospital’s simulation lab is operational 
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(if permitted by the agency) and will re-send the needs assessment survey focusing on the 
responses directly pertaining to PCA documentation. Follow up on the number of near miss 
reports and PCA documentation audits will also continue.   
 As a county-owned, bureaucratic organization, some of the delays in implementation and 
evaluation of the project were expected, although they were not fully planned for. Examples of 
obstacles that were not planned for include a site visit from The Joint Commission and being 
awarded a tentative Level II trauma designation. In addition, the lack of cooperation between the 
department directors and the DNP student over the last several months or the project was not 
expected or anticipated. The lack of information truly hindered the implementation and 
evaluation of the remaining components of the project. The reasons for the lack of cooperation 
and information sharing are still unclear.   
 There are several implications for patient care and developing health professional; both 
leadership and healthcare professionals (nurses, physicians, and pharmacists) must be proactive 
in identifying faulty systems and advocate for proper safeguards to be in place. Seamless 
reporting of these events is the critical element in identifying complex system issues. According 
to Tzeng, Yin, and Schneider, “errors need to be appreciated, understood and corrected 
immediately” (2013, p. 15). Full disclosure of medication error rates, types, and circumstances is 
necessary to fully appreciate the scope of the problem. 
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Appendix A: Medication Events with Descriptions 
 
Risk Module – Medication Event Options with related descriptions 
12/16/13 
 
(MEDADR) - Administration Issues: 
• Medication contaminated 
• Delayed administration 
• Duplicate administration 
• Expired Medication identified 
• Omission (not given) 
• Found Med-not taken by patient 
• Pt unable to retain medication 
• Wrong Patient 
• Tampering evident 
• Wrong Time 
 
 
(MEDADDR) - Adverse Drug reaction 
• Adverse Reaction physical 
• Drug/Food Interaction 
• Drug/Drug Interaction 
• Side effect requiring additional meds 
 
 
(MEDALLERG) - Adverse Drug Reaction 
• Allergy Known 
• Allergy Unknown 
 
(MEDDRUG) -  Drug Events (5 Rights) 
• Wrong concentration 
• Wrong Drug 
• Wrong Dose 
• Wrong Form 
• Wrong Route 
• Wrong rate of administration 
 
 
(MEDMAR) - MAR Issues     
• Medication D/C'ed still on MAR 
• Duplicate order on MAR 
• Incorrect instruction 
• Incorrect Transcription of Med 
• Medication ordered, not on MAR 
 
 
(MEDNARC) - Narcotic / Count Issues 
• Count incorrect 
• Waste incorrect 
 
 
(MEDOVERR) -  Override Issues 
• Emergency event   
• Medication ordered, not on MAR 
 
(MEDPHA) -  Pharmacy Issues 
• Expired medication found 
• Pyxis fill error 
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Appendix C: Additional slides from patient safety/risk notifications training course: 
 
 
 
 
 
Patient Safety/Risk 
Notifications 
 
From paper to electronic 
AKA “incident report” or “occurrence report” 
 
Was previously known as Quality Review Report (QRR) 
Risk Management Program 
 The purpose of a Risk Management program is to 
identify risks of harm to patients, visitors or staff, 
implement strategies to reduce the risk, and manage the 
potential outcome following any unusual occurrence 
(including managing, with the Claims Management 
Department, any claims or lawsuits that might result).  
One of the ways to identify potential or actual risks is 
through an Occurrence Reporting System. 
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Occurrence Reporting 
 Assists in identifying care or safety conditions that may 
result in an injury to a patient or staff.  
 
 Assists in monitoring frequency and severity of 
occurrences, identifying opportunities for quality 
improvement and/or potential legal liability and 
implementing corrective action.  
Definition of Occurrence 
 Any unanticipated event that deviates 
from regular hospital operations. 
 
Injury or harm may or may not result 
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8 of 30 
 
 Error:  An unintended event or act.  This can be 
something that was done or something that should have 
been done but wasn’t. 
 
 Near Miss:  An event that was “caught” and caused no 
harm, but for which a recurrence carries a significant 
chance of harm. 
 
 Hazardous Condition:  Any set of circumstances which 
significantly increase the likelihood of a serious adverse 
outcome. 
Types of Occurrences 
MEDICATION SAFETY  82 
Appendix D: Medication Safety Scenario Development Worksheets 
 
Appendix D1: PCA Care and Management: Documentation Change in Provider 
IDENTIFIED PROBLEM/SCENARIO TOPIC 
MEDICATION SAFETY REGARDING PCA USE ON A 
MED/SURG ACUTE CARE FLOOR.   
DESIRED CHANGE/OVERALL GOAL 
ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION 
ASSESSMENT OF COMPLICATIONS 
CASE SUMMARY 
POST OP PATIENT WITH A PCA.  
 
CRITICAL PERFORMANCE ELEMENTS 
PROPER DOCUMENTATION DURING CHANGE OF 
PROVIDERS WITH TWO NURSES 
CASE FLOW  (15-20 MINUTE SIMULATION TIME MAXIMUM) 
INITIATION OF SCENARIO 
During change of shift: (Change in 
provider)   
 
 
 
 
FIRST FRAME 
1. Performs hand hygiene, 
introduces self, identifies the 
patient and explains purpose. 
2. PCA check at the bedside; 
3. RN asks for a 2nd RN to help 
4. Brings WOW to bedside 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECOND FRAME 
For change in provider:  
 
1. Completes documentation under PCA Change/Co-signature required in 
Meditech.  
2. Verify PCA SETTINGS (with second independent verification): 
a. Clicks the “Yes” box 
3. GENERAL:   
a. NOTES the number of injections, number of attempts, amount of drug in 
(ml) and (mg/mcg).  
4. PROVIDER CHANGES: Checks the boxes for: 
a. “pump cleared” 
b. “change in care provider” 
5. COMMENT as needed 
 
 
THIRD FRAME 
Clears the pump in two places: 
1.  Patient history (Zooms to 24 
hours) and  
2.  Volume infused 
 
 
 
 
FOURTH FRAME 
Documents in the IV spreadsheet 
1. Enter intake in mls 
 
 
D 
E 
B 
R 
I 
E 
F 
SCENARIO END POINT: ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION BY BOTH NURSES 
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Appendix D: Medication Safety Scenario Development Worksheets 
 
Appendix D2: PCA Care and Management: Documentation when PCA is discontinued 
IDENTIFIED PROBLEM/SCENARIO TOPIC 
MEDICATION SAFETY REGARDING PCA USE ON A 
MED/SURG ACUTE CARE FLOOR.   
DESIRED CHANGE/OVERALL GOAL 
ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION 
ASSESSMENT OF COMPLICATIONS 
CASE SUMMARY 
POST OP PATIENT WITH A PCA.  
 
CRITICAL PERFORMANCE ELEMENTS 
DOCUMENTATION DURING DISCONTINUING 
PCA THERAPY WITH TWO NURSES 
CASE FLOW  (20 MINUTE SIMULATION TIME MAXIMUM) 
INITIATION OF SCENARIO 
Physician just completed rounds 
and wrote an order to 
discontinue the PCA and start 
oral analgesics 
 
 
 
 
FIRST FRAME 
1. Performs hand hygiene, 
introduces self, identifies the 
patient and explains purpose. 
2. PCA check at the bedside; 
3. RN asks for a 2nd RN to help 
4. Brings WOW to bedside 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECOND FRAME 
 
1. Completes documentation under PCA Change/Co-signature required in 
Meditech.  
2. GENERAL:   
a. NOTES the number of injections, number of attempts, amount of drug in 
(ml) and (mg/mcg).  
3. PROVIDER CHANGES: Checks the boxes for: 
a. “PCA discontinued” 
4. PCA DRUG WASTED: 
a. Documents amount of drug wasted when syringe changed  
b. Includes 2.6 ml for drug wasted in the tubing  
c. Waste does NOT need to be double documented in the Pyxis 
5. COMMENT as needed 
 
THIRD FRAME 
Clears the pump in two places: 
1.  Patient history (Zooms to 24 
hours) and  
2.  Volume infused 
 
 
 
 
FOURTH FRAME 
Documents in the IV spreadsheet 
1. Enter intake in mls 
 
 
D 
E 
B 
R 
I 
E 
F 
SCENARIO END POINT: ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION BY BOTH NURSES 
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Appendix D: Medication Safety Scenario Development Worksheets 
 
Appendix D3: PCA Care and Management: Documentation when new PCA syringe is 
administered 
IDENTIFIED PROBLEM/SCENARIO TOPIC 
MEDICATION SAFETY REGARDING PCA USE ON A 
MED/SURG ACUTE CARE FLOOR.   
DESIRED CHANGE/OVERALL GOAL 
ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION 
ASSESSMENT OF COMPLICATIONS 
CASE SUMMARY 
POST OP PATIENT WITH A PCA.  
 
CRITICAL PERFORMANCE ELEMENTS 
DOCUMENTATION DURING SYRINGE CHANGE 
WITH TWO NURSES 
CASE FLOW  (20 MINUTE SIMULATION TIME MAXIMUM) 
INITIATION OF SCENARIO 
Patient presses call light saying 
the IV pump is beeping: (Change 
syringe of medication) 
 
 
 
 
FIRST FRAME 
1. Performs hand hygiene, 
introduces self, identifies the 
patient and explains purpose. 
2. PCA check at the bedside; 
3. RN asks for a 2nd RN to help 
4. Brings WOW to bedside 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECOND FRAME 
1. Completes documentation under PCA Setting Assessment (after new syringe is 
scanned)  Verified at the bedside with second nurse 
a. Verify PCA Medication (Morphine) 
b. Infusion mode (Continuous, Intermittent, Continuous with Intermittent, 
Other) 
c. Continuous rate (mg/hr) 
d. PCA intermittent dose (mg) 
e. Lockout interval (minutes) 
f. Max analgesia in 4 hours (mg) 
THIRD FRAME 
1. Completes documentation under PCA Change/Co-signature required in 
Meditech.  
2. Verify PCA SETTINGS (with second independent verification): 
a. Clicks the “Yes” box 
3. GENERAL:   
a. NOTES the number of injections, number of attempts, amount of drug in 
(ml) and (mg/mcg).  
4. PROVIDER CHANGES: Checks the boxes for: 
a. “pump cleared” 
b. “syringe changed” 
5. PCA DRUG WASTED: 
a. Documents amount of drug left in the syringe/wasted when syringe 
changed (include 2.6 ml if tubing is changed) 
6. COMMENT as needed 
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FOURTH FRAME 
Clears the pump in two places: 
1.  Patient history (Zooms to 24 
hours) and  
2.  Volume infused 
 
 
 
 
FIFTH FRAME 
Documents in the IV spreadsheet 
1. Enter intake in mls 
 
 
D 
E 
B 
R 
I 
E 
F 
SCENARIO END POINT: ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION BY BOTH NURSES 
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Appendix D: Medication Safety Scenario Development Worksheets 
 
Appendix D4: PCA Care and Management: Documentation when PCA settings are 
changed 
IDENTIFIED PROBLEM/SCENARIO TOPIC 
MEDICATION SAFETY REGARDING PCA USE ON A 
MED/SURG ACUTE CARE FLOOR.   
DESIRED CHANGE/OVERALL GOAL 
ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION 
ASSESSMENT OF COMPLICATIONS 
CASE SUMMARY 
POST OP PATIENT WITH A PCA.  
 
CRITICAL PERFORMANCE ELEMENTS 
DOCUMENTATION DURING PCA SETTINGS 
CHANGE WITH TWO NURSES 
CASE FLOW  (20 MINUTE SIMULATION TIME MAXIMUM) 
INITIATION OF SCENARIO 
Patient presses call light saying 
increased pain levels not being 
relieved by PCA: (Change PCA 
settings) 
 
 
 
 
FIRST FRAME 
1. Performs hand hygiene, 
introduces self, identifies the 
patient and explains purpose. 
2. PCA check at the bedside; 
3. RN asks for a 2nd RN to help 
4. Brings WOW to bedside 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECOND FRAME 
1. Completes documentation under PCA Setting Change Assessment  Verified at 
the bedside with second nurse 
a. Verify PCA Medication (Morphine) 
b. Infusion mode (Continuous, Intermittent, Continuous with Intermittent, 
Other) 
c. Continuous rate (mg/hr) 
d. PCA intermittent dose (mg) 
e. Lockout interval (minutes) 
f. Max analgesia in 4 hours (mg) 
THIRD FRAME 
1. Completes the intervention of “PCA initiation monitoring assessment” (when 
increasing the dose or rate; do not complete this if dose is being decreased) 
2. Adds the “PCA change monitoring” intervention and documents according to 
policy:  
a. VS, pain, EtCO2 and/or O2 sat Q15 min x 2 (after dose increase) 
b. Sedation level 
FOURTH FRAME 
Clears the pump in two places: 
1.  Patient history (Zooms to 24 
hours) and  
2.  Volume infused 
 
 
 
 
FIFTH FRAME 
Documents in the IV spreadsheet 
1. Enter intake in mls 
 
 
D 
E 
B 
R 
I 
E 
F 
SCENARIO END POINT: ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION BY BOTH NURSES 
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Appendix E: Pro Forma/Operating Statement 
 
Operating Statement: Amount 
Requested 
Total 
REVENUE:   
No revenue will be generated for this project; rather, a cost 
savings will be realized by preventing avoidable adverse drug 
events.  
Not Applicable N/A 
EXPENSES:   
PERSONNEL:   
A. RN coordinator (DNP student)  
** Waived Volunteer   (300 hrs x $64 + benefits ~ 35%) 
+$19,200 
+$6,720 benefits 
$25,920 
B. Pharmacy Director + benefits 
(# ~8 meetings x 1 hr @~$70/hr salary + benefits ~ 35%) 
+$560 
+$196 (benefits) 
$756 
C. Education Director + benefits 
(# ~8 meetings x 1 hr @~$70/hr salary + benefits ~ 35%) 
+$560 
 +$196 (benefits) 
$756 
D. Quality Management Director + benefits 
(# ~8 meetings x 1 hr @~$70/hr salary + benefits ~ 35%) 
+$560 
+$196 (benefits) 
$756 
E. Simulation technician 
(60 hrs x $30/hr) + benefits 
+$1,800 
+$630 (benefits) 
$2,430 
F. Nursing salary for attending in-service and simulation 
100 nurses x 3 hrs x $60/hr + benefits 
+$18,000 
+$6,300 (benefits) 
$24,300 
G. IT specialist to program TEST patients in Meditech $300 $300 
Subtotal Personnel Expenses:  $55,218 
OPERATING EXPENSES:   
Employee incentives 
(Meal vouchers/Starbucks gift card to complete needs 
assessment)    $10/nurse  ($10 x 100 nurses) 
 
$1,000 
 
$1,000 
Printed educational hand out materials 
 
$400 $400 
Simulation costs: Lab usage for 4 hours (includes set up, tear 
down, debriefing, hi-fidelity manikin, rooms)  
25 sessions x $150/sessions (flat rate) 
 $3750  $3,750 
Supplies (PCA pump tubing, syringes, IV solutions, saline 
flushes, simulated medication tablets) 
$2000 $2,000 
Subtotal Operating Expenses:  $7,150 
Grand Total:  $62,368 
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Appendix F: Cost/Benefit Analysis 
 
 
Costs Benefits 
Personnel salaries: 
DNP student coordinator 
(waived) 
Pharmacy, Education, 
Quality Management 
Directors  
Simulation technician 
IT program specialist 
Nursing staff salary to 
attend in-service 
$55, 218 Preventing a medication 
error and avoiding associated 
costs: 
Direct/indirect costs 
Increases in medical 
professional liability 
Legal settlement costs 
Extended length of stay 
Additional supply costs 
Potential 
savings of 
$487,690 per 
medication 
error avoided 
(specifically 
related to 
narcotics) 
Employee incentives:  
Meal vouchers 
Starbucks gift cards 
$1000   
Printed educational material: 
Handouts 
$400   
Simulation costs: 
Manikin usage 
Wear and tear on manikin 
Necessary supplies (PCA 
tubing/syringes etc) 
$2000   
Total: $62,368  $487,690 
 
Payback time is approximately one month after fully implementing the medication safety 
education program.  
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Appendix G: Responsibility Matrix 
 
 
Project Team: Medication Safety Education Module 
Task: Subtask: 
DNP 
student 
Qual 
Mg't 
Dir 
IT 
spec 
Pharm 
Dir 
Educ 
Dir 
Educ 
SN-
III 
M/S 
Dir 
Online 
reporting for 
medication 
errors/near 
miss events 
Implement online risk 
notification module   R           
Redefine dictionaries for 
medication event 
categories and 
subcategories  S R S S       
Create education/training 
plan for roll out  S R           
Develop content for 
module for overview of 
medication safety R S     S     
Needs 
Assessment 
specific to the 
care and 
management 
of patients 
with a PCA 
Develop survey on 
current knowledge and 
comfort level with PCAs R S   S S S S 
Send out link to M/S 
nurses R           S 
Collect and analyze 
results of survey R             
Distribute survey results R 
Medication 
Safety 
Learning 
Module 
 
 
 
 
Develop content for 
module (specific content)  R S     S     
Develop pre/post test R S           
Peer review feedback 
from staff nurse III's R           S 
Analyze results from 
pre/post test R             
Revise content based on 
results as needed R             
Simulation 
Exercise 
 
 
Write clear and directed 
learning objectives R     S   S S 
Develop realistic 
scenario R         S   
Pilot and validate 
scenario R         S S 
R=Responsible 
                
S=Supports/assists 
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Appendix H: Medication Safety Survey about PCA use  
 
The purpose of this survey is to enable a Doctoral student (in Nursing Practice DNP) to 
complete a needs assessment and collect baseline information about nurses' current 
knowledge of PCA use and maintenance in terms of medication safety.  
 
This survey should take 4 1/2 minutes to complete. Your time and cooperation are greatly 
appreciated. The survey will be open until 4/10/14.  
 
Demographic Information  
 
Please indicate how many years of nursing experience you have (at any hospital or 
healthcare agency) and how long you have worked on Med/Surg 3 (specifically) at this 
hospital.  
1. How many years of nursing experience do you have?  
a. 0-2 years 
b. 3-5 years 
c. 6-10 years 
d. More than 10 year 
 
2. How long have you worked as a registered nurse on Med/Surg 3 at NMC?  
a. 0-2 years 
b. 3-5 years 
c. 6-10 years 
d. More than 10 year 
 
Baseline data  
 
3. How comfortable are you working with patient controlled analgesia (PCA) devices?  
a. Not very comfortable 
b. Moderately comfortable 
c. Very comfortable 
 
4. How familiar are you with the hospital's PCA policy?  
a. Not very familiar 
b. Moderately familiar 
c. Very familiar 
 
MEDICATION SAFETY  91 
Implementing the PCA policy  
  
5. What topics do you include when teaching the patient/family about the PCA use? 
Select all that apply.  
a. About the actual medication (i.e. peak, onset, duration)  
b. Frequency of assessment required  
c. Side effects to report  
d. When to press the button  
e. Who can press the button  
f. Use of the PCA  
g. Other (please specify what additional information you teach your patient)  
 
6. How frequently do you monitor a patient with a PCA on initiation? Select all that 
apply for each relevant parameter.  Please note: Only answer for when you are 
INITIATING a new PCA.  
 Q15 
min 
x2 
Q30 
min 
x2 
Q1 
hour 
x2 
Q1 
hour 
Q2 
hours 
x2 
Q2 
hours 
N/A 
 
Oxygen saturation        
Respiration Rate        
Vital signs (HR/BP)        
Pain/ Sedation level        
Other (please specify which parameter and how frequently) [free text] 
 
7. How frequently do you monitor a patient with a PCA after each dose increase? Select 
all that apply for each relevant parameter. Please note: Only answer for when you 
have INCREASED THE DOSE on the PCA.  
 Q15 
min 
x2 
Q30 
min 
x2 
Q1 
hour 
x2 
Q1 
hour 
Q2 
hours 
x2 
Q2 
hours 
N/A 
 
Oxygen saturation        
Respiration Rate        
Vital signs (HR/BP)        
Pain/ Sedation level        
Other (please specify which parameter and how frequently) [free text] 
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8. How frequently do you monitor a patient for the duration of PCA therapy? Select all 
that apply for each relevant parameter. Please note: Only answer for what you 
monitor DURING PCA therapy.  
 Q15 
min 
x2 
Q30 
min 
x2 
Q1 
hour 
x2 
Q1 
hour 
Q2 
hours 
x2 
Q2 
hours 
N/A 
 
Oxygen saturation        
Respiration Rate        
Vital signs (HR/BP)        
Pain/ Sedation level        
Other (please specify which parameter and how frequently) [free text] 
 
9. When do PCA settings/procedures require verification by 2 licensed staff (i.e. 
witness/cosign)? Select all that apply.  
a. When the PCA is initially set up  
b. When medication dose or limit has changed  
c. At end of shift  
d. When caregivers are changed  
e. When the medication syringe is replaced  
f. When the PCA is discontinued  
g. When the PCA pump is cleared at every handoff  
h. During patient assessment  
i. When any medication is wasted (including the tubing)  
j. Prior to transporting patient off the floor  
 
10. When does the PCA pump need to be cleared (i.e. zeroed)? [free text] 
 
11. When clearing the pump, which two places need to be zeroed? Select all that apply.  
a. Patient history 
b. Volume infused  
c. Dose request setup  
d. Drug event history  
 
12. During your shift, the patient had 4 attempts, 4 injections, and received a total of 16 
mg/(16 ml) of Morphine. When changing providers, what must you and the 
oncoming RN document before you can leave the unit? Select all that apply.  
a. Document under the PCA setting Change Intervention  
b. Document under the PCA CoSignature  
c. Required Intervention  
d. Document the total amount of drug infused in the IV spreadsheet  
e. Document on the PCA Initiation Monitoring Intervention  
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13. In terms of question #12, when this documentation is taking place (changing 
providers), where are you and the oncoming nurse?  
a. At the nurses station  
b. At the patient's bedside  
c. In the hallway  
d. In the charting room  
 
14. When do you document the additional 2.6 ml (for the volume of the tubing) on the 
IV spreadsheet? Select all that apply.  
a. When the PCA is discontinued  
b. Every time the pump is cleared (zeroed)  
c. When the tubing is changed  
d. Every time a new syringe is started  
 
15. When is the most common time of the day for a patient to experience respiratory 
depression?  
a. 6am12pm (0600 - 1200)  
b. 12pm6pm (1200 - 1800)  
c. 6pm12am (midnight) (1800 - 0000)  
d. 12am (midnight) to 6am (0000 - 0600)  
 
16. The most important predictor of respiratory depression in patients receiving 
intravenous (IV) opioid analgesics in the hospital setting is:  
a. Respiratory rate 
b. Patient-reported pain intensity 
c. Sedation level 
d. Blood pressure 
 
17. How do you know if a patient has a higher risk for respiratory depression? [free 
text] 
 
18. How do you know if a patient is opiate naïve? [free text] 
 
19. What are your biggest obstacles/challenges when caring for patients with a PCA?  
[free text] 
 
20. Please include your name and email address if you wish to be entered into a raffle 
for a variety of gift baskets. Responses will be aggregated anonymously; your 
individual responses will be kept confidential. I promise.  
Name:  
Email Address:  
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Appendix I: Gap Analysis 
 
 
Current Practice Action Steps Desired Practices 
(Goals) 
 
Where are we now? How do we plan to move 
forward? 
Where would we like 
to be? 
There is a “huge gap in near 
miss reporting” 
• Define the gap 
• Delineate between near miss 
and an actual medication error 
• Implement new risk module for 
online reporting 
• Train staff on how to use new 
reporting process 
• Educate clinical staff on 
definition of near miss event 
and why it is important to report 
•  
Increase the number of 
near miss reports by 
10% in the first 4 
months and by 30% 
after 8 months. 
1/3 of nurse are not 
documenting correctly on 
the PCA intervention 
screens and IV flow sheet 
• Determine the scope of the 
problem 
• Understand workflow process 
of nurses caring for patients 
with a PCA 
o interview nurses 
o provide just in time 
education 
o conduct needs 
assessment 
o plan simulation activity 
to high light correct 
documentation 
procedures  
>70% of nurses will be 
compliant with current 
PCA documentation 
requirements by the 
end of the project 
Increase number of ADRs 
related to opioids 
(Morphine) 
• Obtain baseline data regarding 
current knowledge of opioid 
adverse reactions and side 
effects 
• Provide education through a 
simulation activity to increase 
awareness of ADRs and how 
to report them. 
Reduce the number of 
ADRs related to 
opioids by 20% 
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Appendix J: Gantt Chart 
Medication Safety Education Program   
  2013 2014 
  Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Establish MOU 
agreement 
 began in April 2013 and final approval was obtained in September 2013 
  
        
Online reporting tool Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Redefine dictionary   ar o o                       
Plan staff training   ar ar ar                       
Develop training PPT on 
Healthstream   ar ar ar                       
Develop introductory 
PPT about med safety 
for Healthstream 
    o 
o    
M/C                       
Develop post-test       ar                       
Go live with Risk Module         ar     M                     
Analyze post-test results           o o   M       x    C         
Medication Safety 
Module Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Determine scope of 
problem - review QRRs 
FY2013 (July-Jun) 
o o o                         
Develop content for 
series of self-learning 
modules on med safety 
      o o 
o    
M       x x x    C       
Develop pre/post test           o o         x    C       
Peer review education 
module and test           o o       did not complete  x   
Administer safety module               
o       
M o   did not complete  x x 
Analyze test results                   o did not complete    x 
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PCA documentation 
issues Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Conduct staff interviews       o                       
Develop needs 
assessment         o                     
Send survey to M/S 
nurses       
    
o    
M/C 
                  
Collect and analyze 
results       
      
o    
M/C 
                
Disseminate findings               o x/C             
Plan next steps               o x x x x x/C     
Simulation exercise 
for PCAs Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Determine exact 
compliance issue               o x x x x/C       
Develop clear objectives               o       x/C       
Complete scenario 
development worksheets 
drafts for peer review       
          
o     
M   x x x/C     
Develop actual scenario                   o   x x     
Pilot test the scenario                   o   x x     
Validate the scenario                   o   x x     
Implement scenario                   
o     
M   
did not complete 
  
    
KEY: Actual timeline (x) 
Original Plan (o) Completed (C)  
Milestone (M) Agency responsibility (ar) 
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Appendix K: Post Simulation Evaluation/Reflection Questions 
 
1. The simulation experience was relevant to my clinical practice. 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
 
2. I was able to identify the patient’s primary problem. 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
 
3. I was able to make clinical decision and determine appropriate interventions. 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
 
4. The simulation experience seemed realistic. 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
 
5. The simulation experience expanded my awareness of PCA documentation 
requirements. 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
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6. The debriefing/reflection session allowed me to explore my decision-making skills. 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
 
7. The debriefing/reflection session provided valuable feedback. 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
 
8. The overall experience helped me to identify areas of practice where I am strong. 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
 
9. The overall experience helped me to identify areas where I need more practice. 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neutral 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
 
10. How long did it take you to engage or immerse into the simulation? 
a. Immediately 
b. 2-5 minutes 
c. 6-10 minutes 
d. Never fully engaged 
e. Other [FREE TEXT] 
 
11. List one way your practice will change as a result of this simulation experience. 
[FREE TEXT]. 
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Appendix L: SWOT analysis 
 
 Helpful Harmful 
In
te
rn
a
l o
ri
gi
n
 
(M
ic
ro
sy
st
em
) 
Strengths: 
Have support from Pharmacy, Education 
and Quality Management. 
Expertise of nursing faculty in various 
teaching methodologies.  
Increase reports of near misses help to build 
a safer healthcare system. 
New simulation suite is being built in the 
education department. 
Simulation is a formative process. 
Simulation is a safe-environment to 
experience a “mistake”. 
Scenarios enhance realism and provide 
excellent active learning opportunities. 
A simulation-learning environment helps the 
participant change mental models through 
the debriefing process. 
Safe and effective. 
 
Weaknesses: 
Simulation resources need to be fully 
implemented. 
Need access to enough PCA pumps for 
training purposes. 
Nurses would need to be compensated for 
their time to attend the simulation 
experience.  
Coordination of time/schedules to offer 
simulation experience.  
Nurse resistance to learning a new practice 
policy.  
Nurses may not fully understand purpose of 
simulation-based learning. 
Need administrative support (from 
individual nursing unit managers/directors). 
Dependent on outside vendors to complete 
simulation suite in the established 
timeframe.  
Ex
te
rn
a
l o
ri
gi
n
 
(M
a
rc
ro
sy
st
em
) 
Opportunities: 
Simulation scenarios can be published for 
PCA training/in-service. 
Medication module can be marketed. 
Conduct a needs assessment to determine 
obstacles and barriers of PCA 
documentation and assessment in order to 
address the root cause of the problem. 
 
Threats:  
Budget for simulation is not fully 
established. 
Scheduling simulation experiences within 
nurses busy work schedules. 
May incur overtime to have participation in 
simulation scenario. 
Nurses may feel threatened or fear poor 
performance will be reflected on evaluation. 
Nurses may not want to participate in 
simulation experience. 
Nurses may not want to complete the 
medication safety self-learning module.  
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Appendix M: Business Plan Proposal – Presentation of Options 
 
Presentation Of Options 
The status quo. If there is no change in the current practice of caring for patients with 
PCAs, the poor practice issues are likely to continue. These practices pose a huge liability for the 
hospital by increasing the risk for medication errors and patient harm, which results in litigation 
and settlement. From a macrosystem perspective, the hospital may face fines and penalties from 
licensing bodies, regulatory and accreditation agencies in addition to poor performance scores on 
patient satisfaction surveys.  
The preferred solution. The proposed solution is to implement a tailored education 
program to address the obstacles and barriers preventing nurses from adhering to the PCA policy 
with 100% compliance. In order to tackle the specific needs of the staff, a pre and post survey 
will be conducted to assess current practice and knowledge of frequency of assessments and 
types of assessments (pain, sedation, respiratory) required. An education module through 
Healthstream about medication safety from a system perspective, defining a medication error, 
ADE, and near miss event, and introducing the tenets of just culture is the first step. Expected 
results include following policy, documenting correctly, performing timely patient assessments 
and consistently completing independent verifications when required. There is multidisciplinary 
support for the education program from the pharmacy director, education director, quality 
management director, and the chief nursing officer.  
The alternate solution. An alternative approach is to provide the education module only 
related to PCA safety to all nurses. However, this solution does not address the root cause of the 
nurses inadequate documentation related to PCA use. It is more expensive to repeat the 
education to all staff rather than collecting data on the obstacles and barriers facing the nurses to 
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comply with the policy, specific education/interventions can be tailored to improve effectiveness 
of the educational program. 
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Appendix N: Return on Investment and Break Even Analysis 
Return on Investment:  
 
Return on Investment (ROI) =      Gain (Savings) $1,628,760 – Cost $62,368 
                                Cost $62,368 
ROI (Direct costs) = 25.12% 
  
Return on Investment (ROI) =      Gain (Savings) $1,928,760 – Cost $62,368 
                                Cost $62,368 
ROI (Direct + Indirect Costs) = 29.9% 
LOGIC: 
• Annual cost for preventable ADE in payer costs = $600,000 
• If 50% of preventable ADEs are related to injectable medications, then 
annual cost = $300,000 
• Annual MPL cost from injectable medications = $72,000  
• Therefore, annual costs for ADE’s related to injectable medications = 
$372,000 
• Multiple by 0.33% (probability of ADE being related to narcotics) = 
$122,760 is the total annual costs for ADEs related to narcotics. 
• Legal settlement costs = $376,500 per case 
• A conservative assumption of 4 occurrences/year, places the total cost of 
legal fees to $1,506,000 
• Add the legal fees to the annual costs for narcotic ADEs = $1,628,760 
• If indirect costs are included, we can add an additional conservative estimate 
of $75,000 per event ($300,000), for a grand total $1,928,760 
 
 
Break-Even Analysis (direct and indirect cost of ADE):  
 
Quantity (Q) =                  Fixed Cost (FC) 
         Price (P) per event– Variable Cost (VC) 
Quantity (Q) =                  FC = $62,368 
         P= $487,690 – VC (unknown) 
Q = 0.13 
A return on investment can be realized one month after implementing the 
medication safety education program. 
LOGIC: 
• Price per event = $122,760 is the total annual costs for ADEs 
related to narcotics divided by 4 events = $30,690. 
• Plus the cost of the medication error/ADE itself = $5,500 
• Plus the conservative estimate of indirect costs/event = $75,000 
• Plus legal settlement costs of $376,500/event 
• Grand total per event = $487,690 
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Appendix O: Selected Results of Needs Assessment 
 
Question #3: 
 
 
 
 
 
Question #4:  
 
 
 
How comfortable are you working with patient controlled analgesia (PCA) 
devices?
Not very comfortable
Moderately 
comfortable
Very comfortable
How familiar are you with the hospital's PCA policy?
Not very familiar
Moderately 
familiar
Very familiar
Medication Safety 
 
How frequently do you monitor a patient with a PCA on initiation? Select all that 
apply for each relevant parameter.  Please note: Only answer for when you are 
INITIATING a new PCA. 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Oxygen Saturation Respiration Rate
How frequently do you monitor a patient with a PCA on initiation? Select all that 
apply for each relevant parameter.  Please note: Only answer for when you are 
Question #6:  
 
 
 
Vital Signs (heart 
rate/blood 
pressure)
Pain/Sedation 
Level
INITIATING a new PCA.
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Q15min x2
Q30min x2
Q1hour x2
Q1hour
Q2hours x2
Q2hours
Not 
Applicable
Medication Safety 
 
How frequently do you monitor a patient with a PCA 
all that apply for each relevant parameter. Please note: Only answer for when you 
have INCREASED THE DOSE on the PCA. 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Oxygen Saturation Respiration Rate
How frequently do you monitor a patient with a PCA after each dose increase? 
Select all that apply for each relevant parameter.  Please note: Only answer for 
when you have INCREASED THE DOSE on the PCA.
Question #7: 
after each dose increase? Select 
 
Vital Signs (heart 
rate/blood 
pressure)
Pain/Sedation 
Level
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Q15min x2
Q30min x2
Q1hour x2
Q1hour
Q2hours x2
Q2hours
Not 
applicable
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How frequently do you monitor a patient for the duration of PCA therapy? Select al
that apply for each relevant parameter. Please note: Only answer for what you 
monitor DURING PCA therapy. 
 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Oxygen Saturation Respiration Rate
How frequently do you monitor a patient for the duration of PCA therapy? Select 
all that apply for each relevant parameter.  Please note: Only answer for what you 
Question #8: 
 
Vital Signs (heart 
rate/blood pressure)
Pain/Sedation Level
monitor DURING PCA therapy.
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l 
 
 
Q15min x2
Q30min x2
Q1hour x2
Q1hour
Q2hours x2
Q2hours
Not 
applicable
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Question #9: 
 
When do PCA settings/procedures require verification by 2 licensed staff (i.e. witness/co-sign)? 
Select all that apply. 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
When the PCA is initially set up 100.0% 11 
When medication dose or limit has 
changed 
100.0% 11 
At end of shift 90.9% 10 
When caregivers are changed 100.0% 11 
When the medication syringe is 
replaced 
100.0% 11 
When the PCA is discontinued 100.0% 11 
When the PCA pump is cleared at every 
handoff 
100.0% 11 
During patient assessment 0.0% 0 
When any medication is wasted 
(including the tubing) 
100.0% 11 
Prior to transporting patient off the floor 36.4% 4 
answered question 11 
skipped question 10 
    
 
 
 
Question #11:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
100.0%
120.0%
Patient history Volume infused Dose request setup Drug event history
When clearing the pump, which two places need to be zeroed? Select all 
that apply.
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 Question #12:  
 
 
 
Question #13: 
 
 
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
100.0%
120.0%
Document under the 
PCA setting Change 
Intervention
Document under the 
PCA Co-Signature 
Required 
Intervention
Document the total 
amount of drug 
infused in the IV 
spreadsheet
Document on the 
PCA Initiation 
Monitoring 
Intervention
During your shift, the patient had 4 attempts, 4 injections, and received a 
total of 16 mg/(16 ml) of Morphine.  When changing providers, what must 
you and the oncoming RN document before you can leave the unit?  Select 
all that apply.
In terms of question #12, when this documentation is taking place (changing 
providers), where are you and the oncoming nurse?
At the nurses station
At the patient's 
bedside
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Question #15: 
 
 
 
 
 
Question #16: 
 
When is the most common time of the day for a patient to experience 
respiratory depression?
6am-12pm                          (0600-
1200)
12pm-6pm                          (1200-
1800)
6pm-12am (midnight)         (1800-
0000)
12am (midnight) to 6am     (0000-
0600)
The most important predictor of respiratory depression in patients receiving 
intravenous (IV) opioid analgesics in the hospital setting is:
Respiratory rate
Patient-reported pain 
intensity
Sedation level
Blood pressure
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 Appendix P: Staff Meeting Presentation Handout 
PCA Care and Management: Results from the Survey 
 
Expected frequency of 
monitoring per policy: 
Upon initiating 
PCA therapy 
With any dose 
increase 
Duration of 
PCA therapy 
Vital signs Q15 min x2 
Q30 min x2 
Q1 hour x2 
Then Q2 hours 
Q15 min x2  
Respiratory rate only   Q2 hours 
Pain and sedation levels Q15 min x2 
Q30 min x2 
Q1 hour x2 
Then Q2 hours 
Q15 min x2 Q2 hours 
ETCO2 and/or O2 sats Q15 min x2 
Q30 min x2 
Q1 hour x2 
Then Q2 hours 
Q15 min x2 Q2 hours 
Table A: Expected frequency of monitoring vital signs per policy and PCA orders  
 
#6. Upon initiating PCA 
therapy (numbers in red 
are incorrect) 
Q15 
min 
x2 
Q30 
min 
x2 
Q1 
hour 
x2 
Q1 
hour 
Q2 
hours 
x2 
Q2 
hours 
N/A 
 
Oxygen saturation 100% 50% 58% 17% 17% 33% 0% 
Respiration Rate 100% 42% 50% 8% 17% 25% 0% 
Vital signs (HR/BP) 100% 45% 45% 9% 9% 27% 0% 
Pain/ Sedation level 90% 36% 45% 27% 18% 27% 0% 
Table B: Survey responses for question #6 
 
#7. With any dose 
increase (numbers in red 
are incorrect) 
Q15 
min 
x2 
Q30 
min 
x2 
Q1 
hour 
x2 
Q1 
hour 
Q2 
hours 
x2 
Q2 
hours 
N/A 
 
Oxygen saturation 83% 42% 33% 8% 8% 25% 0% 
Respiration Rate 83% 42% 33% 8% 9% 25% 0% 
Vital signs (HR/BP) 82% 45% 36% 9% 8% 27% 0% 
Pain/ Sedation level 75% 33% 25% 17% 9% 25% 0% 
Table C: Survey responses for question #7 
 
#8. During PCA therapy 
(numbers in red are 
incorrect) 
Q15 
min 
x2 
Q30 
min 
x2 
Q1 
hour 
x2 
Q1 
hour 
Q2 
hours 
x2 
Q2 
hours 
N/A 
 
Oxygen saturation 8% 8% 8% 17% 8% 92% 0% 
Respiration Rate 10% 10% 10% 20% 10% 90% 0% 
Vital signs (HR/BP) 11% 11% 11% 22% 11% 89% 0% 
Pain/ Sedation level 9% 9% 9% 18% 9% 91% 0% 
Table D: Survey responses for question #8      Barbara Durham, MSN, RN, CNE, DNP-c 
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Appendix P: Staff Meeting Presentation Handout 
Patient Controlled Analgesia: 
 
 
Documentation on PCA’s should be done in real time at the bedside. Both nurses should 
actually see the number of doses given, number of attempts and amount of drug infused 
before clearing the pump. Nurses should not try to rely on memory to document this ‘after 
the fact’. This is documented on the “Co-Signature Intervention” screen in PCS.  
 
 
Always ZOOM to 24 hours when clearing pump with each syringe and care provider 
change. To get the most accurate totals and to ensure consistency.  
  
 
 
PCA Waste 
For PCA Waste ONLY you do not need to double document waste in Pyxis.  PCS Meditech 
documentation is sufficient. Include the 2.6 ml anytime you are discarding the tubing 
(when the PCA is D/C’ed or the tubing needs to be changed).  
 
 
The most important indicator of respiratory depression in patients receiving intravenous 
(IV) opioid analgesics in the hospital setting is actually level of consciousness. 
 
 
Higher risk for respiratory depression occurs between midnight and 6am because of the 
tendency to let patients rest and not disturb them. 
 
 
Opiate naïve patients are those who don’t take a lot of pain medications routinely. Also, 
patients who are older are more susceptible to adverse effects because of changes in 
pharmacokinetics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbara Durham, MSN, RN, CNE, DNP-c  
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Appendix P: Staff Meeting Presentation Handout 
Did you know? Medication Safety FAQs 
 
Question: What is a medication error? 
Answer: A medication error can simply be defined as an actual or potential event, which 
may be preventable, and can lead to patient harm. 
 
Question: What is a near miss event? 
Answer: Making an error in the preparation of medication for a patient, by intercepting or 
recognizing the error before it reaches the patient is an example of a near miss event.  
 
Question: Why is it important to report a near miss event? 
Answer: It is important to report these types of errors because of many reasons. 1) It is 
likely a “system” problem. 2) Someone else can make the same mistake, but maybe, this 
time it reaches the patient.  
 
Question: What are examples of system problems? 
Answer: Environmental factors such as poor lighting, noise levels, and equipment failure 
all contribute the increased incidence of medication errors. Also, medication related topics 
such look alike-sound alike (LASA) medications, similar packaging and labels for 
medications impact the accuracy of medication administration. Sometimes, orientation 
about the policies and procedures for medication administration was inadequate or 
insufficient training with the medication delivery system or barcoding/scanning 
technology was received. In addition, personnel issues such as heavy workload, high 
patient/nurse ratios, lack of staff or presence of new staff nurses produces an unsafe 
environment within which the nurse works. Lastly, technology, lack of clinical decision 
support features, and equipment failures are more examples of system problems that 
contribute to medication errors.  
 
Question: What are examples of human problems? 
Answer: Communication issues contribute to medication errors if physician orders are not 
clearly understood, or not questioned when appropriate. Process issues such as 
distractions and interruptions (such as events on the unit, patient needs, demands from 
coworkers) can affect the provider’s ability to focus on the task of administering 
medications. The experience of the nurse was a factor in avoiding medication errors; lack of 
experience was a likely contributing factor to explain deviations from policies, procedures, 
and protocol that resulted in a medication error. Lack of knowledge related to 
pharmacology and math calculation skills was linked to more medication errors. Poor 
understanding the equipment, such as IV infusion pumps, added to problem of medication 
errors. Nurses who multi-task or prepare medications in advance could predispose them to 
making errors.  
 
 
Barbara Durham, MSN, RN, CNE, DNP-c  
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Appendix P: Staff Meeting Presentation Handout 
 
Question: Are medication errors and near miss events, really such a big problem? 
Answer: Yes. Here are a few facts: 
1. The human and financial costs of these errors are astronomical; estimated direct 
costs are approximately $21 billion, indirect costs exceed $75 billion and account for 
approximately 7000 lives lost annually.  
2. At least 1.5 million preventable medication errors and adverse drug events occur 
each year in the United States, excluding errors of omission. 
3. Not all medication errors are detected and not all detected errors are reported; they 
are underestimated and generally under-reported by an estimated 90% 
4. It is estimated that on average, the hospitalized patient will be exposed to a 
minimum of one medication error each day they are hospitalized. 
5. It is estimated that for every detected medication error, there are approximately 
100 errors that go undetected daily as a result of the sheer volume of medications 
being prescribed, dispensed, and administered in the hospital. 
6. The severity of harm for patients experiencing a medication error is low; greater 
than 90% of all medication errors result is no or low harm, with only 10% 
contributing to serious patient harm.  
7. One study found that 36% of errors resulted in slightly increased monitoring, 31% 
of errors did not result in patient harm, and 26% of the errors did not actually reach 
the patient. 
8. Approximately 50% of nurses are reticent about reporting medication errors 
because they fear disciplinary action. 
9. One third of all medication errors occur during the administration phase of 
medication delivery; making nurses well positioned to recognize near miss events 
and prevent medication errors. 
 
Question: As a nurse, can I really make a difference: 
Answer: Yes.  
1. Nurses have an obligation to look for risks, report errors or hazards, and help design 
safer systems. 
2. Recognizing conditions contributing to errors is critical so that a safer patient care 
environment can be created. 
3. By reporting medication errors (actual and near miss), the system or work 
environment in which nurses administer medications can be improved. 
4. “If we truly want safer care we will have to design safer care systems” (Berwick and 
Leape) 
5. “We cannot change the human condition, but we can change the conditions under 
which humans work” (Reason) 
6. Emphasis on ‘what’ went wrong, not ‘who’ is at fault is critical  
7. The standard of practice in medicine and nursing is perfection, however healthcare 
professionals acknowledge that mistakes are inevitable and most want to learn from 
the mistakes in an understanding and supportive environment. 
 
Barbara Durham, MSN, RN, CNE, DNP-c 
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Appendix Q: Review of articles about medication safety education programs, scope of the problem/contributing factors and 
costs of medication errors: 
 
Article Background Research Methods and 
Strength of Evidence 
Results Implications 
Medication safety education programs: 
Sears, K., Goldsworthy, 
S., & Goodman, W.M. 
(2010). The relationship 
between simulation in 
nursing education and 
medication safety. 
Journal of Nursing 
Education, 49, 1.pp 52-55  
DOI:10.3928/01484834- 
20090918-12 
 
Could simulation help 
reduce med errors; had 
hard time finding clinical 
placements; are 
knowledge and skills 
learned in simulation 
transferable to clinical? 
RCT using volunteers, 
posttest only design; 3 
treatment groups, 3 
intervention groups;  
54 participants 
 
 Poisson distribution 
P<0.05  
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Experimental, randomly 
assigned 
Level 1; High Quality 
Fewer errors reported in 
the Sim Educ int group 
Lack of knowledge,  
 
Simulation based 
education 
intervention. 
 
Lu, M.C., Yu, S., Chen, 
I.J., Wang, K.K., Wu, 
H.F., & Tang, F.I. (2013). 
Nurses’ knowledge on 
high-alert medications: A 
randomized control trial. 
Nurse Education Today, 
33, 24-30. doi: 
10.1016/j.nedt.2011.11.01
8.  
Explores the effectiveness 
of an educational 
intervention on nurses’ 
knowledge about high-
alert medications  
 
Taiwan 
 
21 wards; 232 nurses,  
control and intervention 
group (60 min educ 
intervention – PPT) with 
pre and post test after 6 
wks 
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Literature review 
Level 1; High Quality 
Pre-test average: 75.8% 
(no diff in control and 
intervention groups) 
100% response rate in 
control; 94% in 
intervention group 
Post-test average: 94.7% 
with paired T-test=10.82 
and p<0.0001 
PPT is an effective 
method for providing 
education in this 
group.  
Dennison, R. D. (2007). A 
medication safety 
education program to 
reduce the risk of harm 
Medication errors are 
under reported and under 
detected. Many nurses are 
unsure about what exactly 
Participants were required 
to complete two 30 min 
computer modules on 
medication safety: 
The Climate of Safety 
Survey was administered 
before and after 
participants completed the 
Medication safety 
education program 
was developed to 
reduce harm caused 
Medication Safety 
 
115
Article Background Research Methods and 
Strength of Evidence 
Results Implications 
caused by medication 
errors. The Journal of 
Continuing Education in 
Nursing, 38, 4, 176-184. 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1365-
2834.2009.00995.x 
 
constitutes a medication 
error.  
 
Focused on high alert IV 
meds,  
 
Analysis of reports from 
the US Pharmacopeia 
MEDMARX reporting 
system 
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Quasi Experimental 
Pre/Post Test 
Level 2; Good Quality  
Medication Safety 
Education Program. 
Stat sign change in 
knowledge scores, but “no 
change in climate of 
safety scores, the use of 
behaviors advocated in 
the medication safety 
education program to 
improve medication 
infusion safety, the 
number of infusion pump 
alerts, or the number of 
reported errors.  
by med errors.  
 
A change in 
knowledge does not 
produce a change in 
practice. 
 
Recommend 
education on problem 
solving on how to 
prevent med errors 
 
Leadership support is 
crucial in creating 
practice change.  
Currie, L. M., Desjardins, 
K. S., Levine, E., Stone, 
P. W., Schnall, R., Li, J., 
& Bakken, S. (2009). 
Web-based hazard and 
near miss reporting as part 
of a patient safety 
curriculum. Journal of 
Nursing Education, 48, 
13, 669-677. 
doi:10.3928/01484834-
20091113-03 
 
Web-based reporting 
system for post-
baccalaureate students; 
incorporate patient safety 
concepts during formative 
nursing educ 
Quantitative data 
collected on two 
questions:  
“On your shift today, 
were there any near 
misses?” 
“On your shift today, 
were there any ‘dangerous 
situations’ that could 
cause a future event?” 
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Non-experimental, 
prospective, observational 
Level 3; High Quality 
 
453 students made 42552 
reports; of the 10206 
“yes” reports – 59% were 
hazards, 41% were near 
misses; of the near misses 
48% had a planned 
interception and 52% had 
unplanned interceptions.  
 
Hazards are more visible 
and easier to report; 
during 1st and 3rd year, 
students reported 2 times 
more hazards (p<0.01).  
Dimensions of safety 
culture 
Transform to become 
HROs  
Patient safety 
curriculum included: 
modeling, 
monitoring, and 
mindfulness 
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Article Background Research Methods and 
Strength of Evidence 
Results Implications 
 
Baker (1997)  Ethnomethodological 
study 
The author identified 6 
ways medication errors 
can be categorized: a) if it 
is not my fault, it is not an 
error; b) if everyone 
knows, it is not an error; 
c) if you can put it right, it 
is not an error; d) if a 
patient has needs that are 
more urgent than the 
accurate administration of 
medication, it is not an 
error; e) if it is a clerical 
error, it is not an error; 
and f) if the irregularity 
prevents something 
worse, it is not an error. 
Clear definitions and 
examples of types of 
medication errors are 
needed so that the 
nurse can recognize 
that an error has 
occurred.  
Page, K., & McKinney, 
A. A. (2007). Addressing 
medication errors: The 
role of undergraduate 
nurse education. Nurse 
Education Today, 27, 
219-224. 
DOI:10.1016/j.nedt.2006.
05.002 
 
Dept of Health reports 
similar to IOM reports 
prompted a look in to 
medical and medication 
errors and began an 
initiative for “improving 
medication safety” 
An educational initiative 
was therefore introduced 
to address this problem. A 
Medication Safety Day, 
which focused on the 
causes of medication 
errors, was implemented 
to highlight how and why 
drug incidents may occur. 
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Literature review 
Level 5; Good Quality 
“Imperative that 
undergraduate education 
should emphasize the 
issues of medication 
safety” 
Med Safety Day with 
focus on causes of 
med errors, “how and 
why”, knowledge of 
pharm for junior 
doctors 
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Article Background Research Methods and 
Strength of Evidence 
Results Implications 
Hughes, R. G. & Blegen, 
M.A. (2008). Chapter 37. 
Medication administration 
safety. In R.G. Hughes 
(Ed), Patient safety and 
quality: An evidence-
based handbook for 
nurses. AHRQ 
Publication No. 08-0043, 
April 2008. Agency for 
Healthcare Research and 
Quality, Rockville, MD. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/
nurseshdbk/ 
AHRQ handbook for 
patient safety 
Summary of literature 
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Literature review 
Level 5; Good Quality 
Strategies to improve med 
admin safety: 
Nationwide voluntary 
efforts – data is not 
reliable or valid 
Nurses’ education and 
training: MAE are most 
likely to be wrong time, 
omission, and wrong or 
extra dose 
System, process and 
human factors: 
technology, distractions, 
and knowledge/math 
skills 
Culture of safety 
Increase staff levels 
Improve system 
factors (new 
technology) 
Include continuing 
education on 
medication 
pharmacokinetics and 
math 
 
 
Choo J . , Hutchinson A. 
& Bucknall T. (2010). 
Nurses' role in medication 
safety. Journal of Nursing 
Management 18, pp. 853–
861. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1365-
2834.2010.01164.x 
Safe med admin is 
essential to patient safety 
Multidisciplinary 
approach, 
interprofessional 
communication  
 
Lit review 
 
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Literature review 
Level 5; Good Quality 
Measures to prevent med 
errors: Establish med 
safety policies, increase 
nurse competence in 
medication 
administration, create safe 
environments for med 
admin, learn from other 
industries (aviation), 
harness information tech 
Adopt safety 
measures similar to 
aviation 
Nurses have a role in 
system redesign 
Focus on the 
accountability of the 
organization, not the 
individual 
Embrace system 
factors 
Tzeng, H.M., Yin, C.Y., 
Schneider, T.E. (2013). 
Medication error-related 
issues in nursing practice. 
MedSurg Nursing, 22, 1, 
Addresses issues related 
to medication errors and 
strategies to decrease 
them 
“Errors need to be 
Literature review 
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Literature review 
Level 5; Good Quality 
Education: patient safety 
mg’t in schools and on the 
job training (i.e. RCA), 
identify knowledge and 
skill deficiencies to 
Use case-based 
scenarios and 
simulation based 
scenarios with 
specific clinical 
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13-16. 
 
appreciated, understood, 
and corrected 
immediately” 
address cognitive errors 
 
examples to 
encourage learning 
and teach clinical 
reasoning 
Leufer, T. & Cleary-
Holdforth, J. (2013). Let’s 
do no harm: Medication 
errors in nursing: Part 1. 
Nurse Education in 
Practice, 13, 213-216. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.nepr.2013.01.013.  
 
Determine the extent and 
severity of the problem of 
medication errors and 
contributing factors 
Literature review 
 
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Literature review 
Level 5; Good Quality 
Complex process: 
(prescription, calculation, 
constitution, checking, 
administration, pt 
assessment, 
documentation, pt med 
educ) 
Extrinsic problems: 
workload, staffing ratio, 
skill mix, # of pt’s, pt 
acuity 
Intrinsic: knowledge 
deficit, practice deficit, 
math skills, inattention/ 
distraction, transcription 
error, and disorganized 
pyxis. 
Competence is a 
dynamic process and 
a continuum  
Identify system 
issues  
Focus on 
fundamentals to 
ensure the highest 
level of safety 
 
Cleary-Holdforth, J. & 
Leufer, T. (2013). The 
strategic role of education 
in the prevention of 
medication errors in 
nursing: Part 2. Nurse 
Education in Practice, 13, 
217-220. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.nepr.2013.01.012.  
Identify the role of 
education to prepare 
nurses for safe medication 
management and reduce 
med errors 
Literature review 
 
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Literature review 
Level 5; Good Quality 
Minimum of 10% error 
rate on drug calculations, 
poor math skills (in one 
study 35% scored > 70%). 
Educate patient/family to 
not distract nurses during 
med admin.  
Onus is on nurse to 
enforce no interruptions 
 
Tailored education 
program helps to 
increase competence 
in med mg’t and 
pharmacology and 
thus decrease 
medication errors 
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Scope of the problem and contributing factors: 
Wolf, Z. R., Hicks, R., 
Serembus, J. F. (2006). 
Characteristics of 
medication errors made 
by students during the 
administration phase: A 
descriptive study. Journal 
of Professional Nursing, 
22, (1), 39-51. 
doi:10.1016/j.profnurs.20
05.12.008 
Examine characteristics of 
medication errors made 
by nursing students 
 
examined characteristics 
of med errors made by 
nursing students using 
MEDMARX database 
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Descriptive, retrospective, 
secondary analysis  
Level 3; Good Quality 
Performance deficit 
Inexperience and 
distractions 
 
Errors of omission and 
wrong dose 
Student med errors 
may be more 
frequent than 
thought; faculty must 
consider curriculum 
revisions 
incorporating 
medication use safety  
Kazaoka, T., Ohtsuka, K., 
Ueno, K., & Mori, M. 
(2007). Why nurses make 
medication errors: A 
simulation study. Nurse 
Education Today, 27, 
312-317. 
DOI:10.1016/j.nedt.2006.
05.011 
Communication problems 
in team nursing systems; 
Simulation involved a 
nurse giving a medication 
prepared by another nurse 
Simulation study 
 
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Non-experimental 
Level 3; Good Quality 
Must fully communicate 
pt symptoms and need for 
med;  
Frequent interruptions 
were recognized as an 
environmental factor  
This study was done 
in Japan using team 
nursing system and is 
not fully applicable 
to the USA. One 
nurse must request 
another nurse to 
administer 
medications.  
Harding, L. and Petrick, 
T. (2008). Nursing student 
medication errors: A 
retrospective review. 
Journal of Nursing 
Education, 47 (1), 43-47. 
 
 Retrospective review of 
med errors by nsg 
students 
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Non-experimental 
Level 3; Good Quality 
 
 
Rights violations 
System factors 
Knowledge and 
understanding 
 
Teaching strategies 
need to account for 
the complexity of 
med admin process 
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Strength of Evidence 
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Wahr, J.A., Shore, A.D., 
Harris, L.H., Rogers, P, 
Panesar, S, Matthew, L., 
… & Pham, J.C. (2014). 
Comparison of intensive 
care unit medication 
errors reported to the 
United States’ MedMarx 
and the United Kingdom’s 
National Reporting and 
Learning System (NRLS): 
A cross-sectional study. 
American Journal of 
Medical Quality, 29 (1), 
61-69. doi: 
10.1177/10628606134829
64 
Compare the 
characteristics of 
medication errors reported 
to MedMarx and NRLS in 
the US and UK. 
Were there substantial 
differences? 
Strength of Evidence: 
Non-experimental, 
retrospective, cross-
sectional 
Level 3; High Quality 
 
Severity scales were 
collapse to conform (for 
categorizing). 
 
n=2,837 UK errors 
n=56,368 US errors 
Descriptive results: 
Low/no harm >90% 
Moderate to severe harm 
< 5% of reports 
Death < 0.1% of reports 
Same high risk 
medications: Insulin, 
heparin, morphine, 
potassium, vancomycin, 
furosemide, fentanyl. 
 
Differences: UK vs US 
Wrong dose 44% vs 29% 
Omitted dose 8.6% vs 
27% 
Mod to severe harm 4.9% 
vs 3.4% 
Gentamycin 7.4% vs 
0.7% 
 
Because of the 
similarities, 
conclusions from 
other European 
studies are likely 
more transferable to 
the United States. 
Westbrook, J. I., Rob, M. 
I., Woods, A., & Parry, D. 
(2011). Errors in the 
administration of 
intravenous medications 
in hospital and the role of 
correct procedures and 
nurse experience. British 
Medical Journal Quality 
and Safety, 20, 1027-
1034. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-
To measure the frequency, 
type and severity of IV 
med administration errors 
in hospitals 
Are there commonalities 
between errors? Any 
association between nurse 
experience or procedural 
failures? 
Study conducted in 
Australia. 
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Non-experimental, 
prospective, observational 
Level 3; Good Quality 
 
n=107 nurses 
n=568 IV meds 
n=6 wards in two teaching 
hospitals 
69.7% of IV med admin 
had at least 1 clinical error 
and 25.5% were serious 
 
Wrong IV rate, mixture, 
volume, and drug 
compatibility accounted 
for 91.7% of errors. 
 IV bolus was associated 
with 312% inc risk of 
error 
IV meds have higher 
risk associated with 
them and often 
produce more serious 
consequences. 
 
Most errors were 
attributed to skill and 
knowledge 
deficiencies.  
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2011-000089  
 
Error rates and 
seriousness decreased 
with more nursing 
experience.  Each year of 
experience (up to 6 years) 
decreased risk of error by 
10.9% and serious error 
by 18.5%. 
Flynn, L., Liang, Y., 
Dickson, G. L., Xie, M., 
& Suh, D.-C. (2012). 
Nurses’ practice 
environments, error 
interception practices, and 
inpatient medication 
errors. Journal of Nursing 
Scholarship, 44, 2, 180-
186. doi:10.1111/j.1547-
5069.2012.01443.x   
Determine relationships 
among characteristics of 
the nurse practice 
environment, staffing 
levels, error interception 
practices, rates of non-
intercepted med errors 
Strength of Evidence: 
Non-experimental 
Level 3; Good Quality 
 
82 Med/Surg units from 
14 US hospitals 
Data collected over 8 
months 
n=686 staff nurses 
Nurses should have more 
frequent engagement in 
interception practices to 
reduce medication errors: 
1. check MAR with MD 
order; 2. determine 
rational for order/med; 3. 
request MDs to rewrite 
improper orders; 4. ensure 
the patient/family are 
knowledgeable and 
encourage them to 
question variances in 
practice 
Supportive practice 
environments 
increase quality 
nursing practices.  
Reid-Searl, K., Moxhan, 
L., & Happell, B. (2010). 
Enhancing patient safety: 
The importance of direct 
supervision for avoiding 
medication errors and 
near misses by 
undergraduate nursing 
students. International 
Focus of this study was to 
examine the extent to 
which nursing students 
might contribute to 
medication errors and the 
factors that influence the 
practice of medication 
administration for 
students.  
Strength of Evidence: 
Qualitative, Grounded 
theory, semi-structured 
interviews were 
audiotaped using open 
ended questions 
Level 3; High Quality 
 
n=28 nursing students 
9/28 students reported 
making a medication error 
or near miss that was 
dependent on the level of 
supervision provided at 
the time of the incident.  
 
Lack of supervision, 
distractions, reactions 
Proper supervision is 
critical to intercept 
medication errors 
made by student 
nurses (establish a 
policy, provide 
training) 
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Journal of Nursing 
Practice, 16, 225-232. 
doi:10.1111/j.1440-
172X.2010.01820.x 
 
The aim was to build 
theory, not to test one.  
Study was conducted in 
Australia. 
 
from supervising nurses 
had an impact on the 
student’s learning 
experience (some nurses 
did not want to complete 
an incident report, while 
others followed the 
protocols) 
Karavasiliadou, S. & 
Athanasakis, E. (2014). 
An inside look into the 
factors contributing to 
medication errors in the 
clinical nursing practice. 
Health Science Journal, 8, 
1, 32-44.  
Aim was to review current 
literature related to the 
individual and the 
organizational factors that 
contribute to the 
occurrence of medication 
errors. 
Strength of Evidence: 
Systematic review 
Level 4; Good Quality 
Inclusion criteria: English, 
published between 1990-
2012. 
Summary of nurse 
factors: 
Miscommunication, 
misreading labels, wrong 
dose calculation, not 
following 5 rights, 
personal neglect (i.e. 
fatigue), amount of 
clinical experience, 
problem with MD orders, 
difficulty/lack of 
knowledge about infusion 
devices 
Summary of 
organizational factors: 
Events on the unit, 
distraction, heavy 
workload, high 
nurse/patient ratios, new 
staff, medication related 
topics (i.s. labeling, 
packaging ) 
 
Focus on prevention 
and prompt detection, 
culture of safety. 
Education methods: 
lecture, simulation, 
projects, case studies 
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Strength of Evidence 
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Kiekkas, P., Karga, M., 
Lemonidou, C., Aretha, 
D., & Karanikolas, M. 
(2011). Medication errors 
in critically ill adults: A 
review of direct 
observation evidence. 
American Association of 
Critical-Care Nurses, 20, 
1, 36-44. 
doi10.4037/ajcc2011331  
 
Review of direct 
observational evidence 
related to IV medication 
administration because 
these drugs are of highest 
risk.  
ICU environment.  
Strength of Evidence: 
Systematic review – 6 
studies met the inclusion 
criteria 
Level 4; Good Quality 
Patterns and 
characteristics of 
medication errors help to 
guide prevention 
strategies.  
 
Opportunities for errors: 
Nurse – patient ratio, 
personnel experience, 
types of drugs involved in 
the errors 
 
Increased monitoring was 
the most common 
consequence of 
medication error. 
Medication errors 
reveal weakness in 
the care process. 
Detection of 
medication errors 
provides insights into 
unsafe practices and 
identify systems 
factors 
Saintsing, D., Gibson, L. 
M. & Pennington, A. W. 
(2011). The novice nurse 
and clinical decision-
making: How to avoid 
errors. Journal of Nursing 
Management, 19, 354-
359. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1365-
2834.2011.01248.x 
 
Novice nurses (<1 yr 
experience) have a higher 
risk of making medication 
errors and need to 
recognize potential 
mistakes 
Literature review 
Found: This review 
examined three themes 
identified within 
the literature including 
types of errors, the cause 
of errors and potential 
interventions.  
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Integrative literature 
review 
Level 4; Good Quality 
 
 
Med errors 
Patient falls 
Delays in treatment 
Critical thinking and 
experience were the 
most common 
themes; and time 
management (with 
med errors). Help 
novice nurses inc 
their awareness of 
potential errors; 
curriculum changes 
to improve clinical 
decision- making.  
Medication Safety 
 
124
Article Background Research Methods and 
Strength of Evidence 
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Brady A.-M., Malone A.-
M. & Fleming S. (2009). 
A literature review of the 
individual and systems 
factors that contribute to 
medication errors in 
nursing practice. Journal 
of Nursing Management 
17, pp. 679–697 
 
Med errors are a 
significant cause of 
M&M. An imperative to 
reduce med errors to 
deliver safe care. 
Lit review: CINAHL, 
PubMed, ScienceDirect, 
Synergy 1988-2007: 
Key words: med errors, 
med mgt, med 
reconciliation, med 
knowledge, math skills, 
reporting med errors 
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Literature review 
Level 5; Good Quality 
These include medication 
reconciliation, the types of 
drug distribution system, 
the quality of 
prescriptions, and 
deviation from procedures 
including distractions 
during administration, 
excessive workloads, and 
nurse’s knowledge of 
medications. 
Establish reporting 
mechanisms, 
systematic approach 
to med recon, clear 
definition of what a 
medication error is to 
increase accuracy of 
reporting (to help 
establish policy 
aimed to reduce med 
errors), math 
competency,  
Benner, P., Sheets, V., 
Uris, P., Malloch, K., 
Schwed, K., & Jamison, 
D. (2002). Individual 
practice, and system 
causes of errors in 
nursing: A taxonomy. 
Journal of Nursing 
Administration, 32, 10, 
509-523.  
Nursing role as patient 
advocate play a key role 
in reducing med errors. 
The goal of the study was 
to develop a taxonomy for 
prospective, systematic 
error reporting; taxonomy 
developed with prevention 
in mind 
Purposeful sample of 21 
cases involving 
competency and clinical 
judgment resulting in 
actual harm were selected 
from 9 state BRNs.  
 
Strength of Evidence: 
Expert Opinion 
Level 5; High Quality 
Identified a “practice 
responsibility” to learn 
from experience and make 
the learning available to 
others to collectively 
change practice;  
Emphasis on the 
importance of 
reporting and sharing 
medication errors that 
have been 
committed.  
Wolf, Z. R. & Serembus, 
J. F. (2004). Medication 
errors: Ending the blame 
game. Nursing 
Management, 35, 8, 41-
48.  
 
To discover the reactions 
of managers and 
personnel involved in 
reporting errors 
Open and closed ended 
question survey, self-
report of serious error 
Response rate - ~7% 
The most common 
disciplinary actions 
included: name identified 
on incident report 54%, 
private verbal reprimand 
27%, counseled 25%, 
notation on personal 
record 11%, referred for 
education 5% 
Culture of safety 
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Cost of medication errors: 
Pinella, J., Murillo, C., 
Carrasco, G., & Humet, 
C. (2006). Case-control 
analysis of the financial 
cost of medication errors 
in hospitalized patients. 
European Journal of 
Health Economics, 7, 66-
71. doi: 10.1007/s10198-
005-0332-z.  
Aim of the study was to 
contribute to what is 
known about the financial 
costs associated with 
medication errors. 
 
Conducted in Spain.  
Strength of Evidence: 
Non-experimental, 
case/control study, 
retrospective analysis 
Level 3; Good Quality 
 
n=172 patient charts were 
analyzed produced a total 
n=63 cases. 
Analysis indicated that 
medication errors added 
303 days of hospital stay, 
overall annual cost of 
nearly €76,000.  
35% orders are not 
validated; 22% were 
dispensing errors; 16% 
administration errors; 
11% due to inattention 
 
36% required increased 
monitoring; 31% no harm; 
approx. 26% were near 
misses.  
 
Average LOS for cases 
was 8.2 days and controls 
was 15.13 days 
Medication errors 
have direct 
consequences with 
the increased 
resources used (labs, 
drugs, materials, etc). 
Indirect costs 
included productivity 
losses and intangible 
costs. 
Lahue, B. J., Pyenson, B. 
S., Iwaskaki, K., Blumen, 
H. E., Forray, S., & 
Rothschild, J. M. (2012). 
National burden of 
preventable adverse drug 
events associated with 
inpatient injectable 
medications: Healthcare 
and medical professional 
liability costs. American 
Study used a healthcare 
payer perspective to 
analyze the probability of 
ADEs and associated 
medical costs related to 
inpatient injectable 
medications, projected 
national number of ADEs 
and their costs.  
Also took a MPL insurer 
perspective in analyzing 
Strength of Evidence: 
Systematic review; 
matched cohorts/ 
compared 
Level 4; High Quality 
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Health & Drug Benefits, 
5, 7. Retrieved from 
www.ahdbonline.com. 
 
medication-related facility 
and professional insurance 
claims to generate a 
national MPL costs 
related to preventable 
ADEs. 
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Appendix R: Work Breakdown Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medication Safety Education – Work Breakdown 
Structure 
Medication Safety 
Education 
Streamline 
online error 
reporting 
Update medication 
event dictionaries 
Create education plan for roll out 
Develop  content for overview of medication 
safety 
Needs 
Assessment Develop survey 
Send out link 
Collect and 
analyze data Distribute findings 
Medication 
safety learning 
module 
Develop specific 
content 
Obtain  feedback 
from peer review 
Develop pre/post 
test Analyze results 
Revise content as 
needed 
Simulation 
Exercise 
Realistic 
scenario 
Develop clear 
objectives 
Pilot tested 
Validated 
